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iAbstract
The Maximality Principle mp is a scheme which states that if a sentence
of the language of zfc is true in some forcing extension V P, and remains true
in any further forcing extension of V P, then it is true in all forcing extensions
of V . A modified maximality principle mpΓ arises when considering forcing
with a particular class Γ of forcing notions. A parametrized form of such a
principle, mpΓ(X), considers formulas taking parameters; to avoid inconsis-
tency such parameters must be restricted to a specific set X which depends
on the forcing class Γ being considered. A stronger necessary form of such
a principle, ✷mpΓ(X), occurs when it continues to be true in all Γ forcing
extensions.
This study uses iterated forcing, modal logic, and other techniques to
establish consistency strengths for various modified maximality principles
restricted to various forcing classes, including ccc, cohen, coll (the forcing
notions that collapse ordinals to ω), < κ directed closed forcing notions, etc.,
both with and without parameter sets. Necessary forms of these principles
are also considered.
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Introduction
The Maximality Principle (mp) states that if a sentence of zfc is true in
some forcing extension V P of V and remains true in any subsequent forcing
extension of V P, then it is true in V . An equivalent form of this principle
says that the given sentence must then be true in all forcing extensions of
V . This principle (or any of its variations) can play a role analogous to
that of other forcing axioms such as MA or PFA in deciding questions which
are left unanswered by zfc alone (for example, concerning the size of the
continuum). It is a dense-set free forcing axiom—it doesn’t require that a
filter meet some family of dense sets; rather, it is expressed in terms of the
forcing relation itself. The maximality principle is discussed extensively in
[HAM1], and some variations are explored in [SV].
The principle mp can be cast in the language of modal logic by regarding
models of zfc as possible worlds and defining one such world to be accessible
from another if the first is a forcing extension of the second. (This relation is
transitive and reflexive, giving rise to the S4 axiom system of modal logic.)
This gives interpretations of the modal concepts of possibility and necessity.
A statement φ is possible (✸φ in the notation of modal logic) if it is true
in some forcing extension and necessary (denoted by ✷φ) if it is true in
every forcing extension. A sentence is possibly necessary, or forceably
necessary if it is true in some forcing extension and remains true in any
subsequent forcing extension. So mp says that if a sentence is forceably
necessary then it is necessary. It is not a formula of zfc: it is a scheme,
the collection of all instances of the statement “✸✷φ implies ✷φ” (or its
S4 equivalent, “✸✷φ implies φ”) where φ ranges over all sentences in the
language of zfc.
The Maximality Principle is equiconsistent with zfc ([HAM1]), but it has
two basic variations of greater consistency strength. The first is a variation in
which any formula φ occurring in an instance of the scheme is allowed to take
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parameters. This variation was denoted MP
∼
(“boldface” mp) in [HAM1], in
which it was shown that the most general class of parameters which does not
render the principle patently false is H(ω1), the set of hereditarily countable
sets. It is easy to see that such a principle with parameters allowed from a
larger set would be false. Indeed, a hereditary uncountable set can be forced
to have countable transitive closure in any further extension, so if it were
allowed as a parameter in mp, it would already be countable, contradicting
the assertion of its uncountability. Since any hereditarily countable set can
be coded by a real, we will denote this variation of mp by mp(R), which
expresses the idea that any statement in the language of set theory with
arbitrary real parameters that is forceably necessary is necessary. In explor-
ing modifications to the maximality principle the new notation, mp(X) for
mp with parameter set X , is more perspicuous when discussing how differ-
ent modifications of mp lead to different natural classes of parameters and on
the other hand, how changing the class of parameters while keeping the same
class of forcing notions leads to a different maximality principle, possibly of
different consistency strength.
The third and final basic form, of greatest consistency strength, is the
Necessary Maximal Principle, or ✷mp(R), which says thatmp(R) is necessary
— it holds in V and every forcing extension V P. This principle has greater
strength (still unknown exactly, but it has been bounded above and below
by consistency strengths that put it well up in the hierarchy, along with
Woodin cardinals and Projective Determinacy, see [HAM1]). This is because
parameters of the formula φ are not restricted to those with interpretation
in V ; they may appear as a result of the forcing that produces the model in
which mp(R) is interpreted and remains necessarily true.
Modified maximality principles arise if one considers possible worlds
(models of zfc) to be accessible only if they are extensions obtained by
forcing with forcing notions of specified classes. If Γ is such a restricted class
of forcing notions, such an accessibility relation can be expressed between
models M1 andM2 by saying thatM2 is a Γ-forcing extension ofM1 (that
is, that M2 = M1[G] where G is M1-generic over some P where P ∈ Γ). A
formula φ is Γ-necessary (denoted by ✷Γφ) when it is true in all Γ-forcing
extensions. (A related concept, used in [SV], defines φ to be Γ-persistent
if, whenever φ is true, it is then true in all Γ-forcing extensions. So if φ is
Γ-persistent it may not be true, in which case it need not be Γ-necessary.
A formula φ is Γ-forceable (denoted by ✸Γφ) when it is true in some Γ-
forcing extension. (Note that, as in other interpretations of possibility and
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necessity, that ✸ and ✷ are dual to each other—✸φ can be defined as ¬✷¬φ.)
A formula φ is Γ-possibly necessary or Γ-forceably necessary (denoted
by ✸Γ✷Γφ) if it is Γ-forceable that φ is Γ-necessary. (The determination as
to whether a forcing notion P in a Γ-forcing extension is itself in Γ is made
de dicto. That is, Γ is a definable class in zfc, as as such, its members
are formally determined by satisfying its defining formula. So this formula is
interpreted in the model of zfc in which P will be forced with.) The modified
maximality principle that arises with these notions is denoted mpΓ, which
says that if a formula of zfc is true in some Γ-forcing extension V P, (that is,
where P ∈ Γ) of V and remains true in any subsequent Γ-forcing extension
of V P, then it is Γ-necessary in V (hence true, if Γ includes the trivial forcing
notion {∅}, as it almost always will). In terms of the symbols just introduced,
the principle mpΓ can be expressed as the scheme ✸Γ✷Γφ =⇒ ✷Γφ where φ
can be any statement in the language of zfc.
If a modified maximality principle is allowed to take parameters, then the
notation indicated above will be used to indicate a modified maximality prin-
ciple with parameters from the class specified in parentheses. Thus, a formula
is ccc-necessary if it is true in all ccc-forcing extensions. The principle
mpccc(H(2
ω)) then says that any formula with a parameter from H(2ω)—the
sets hereditarily of cardinality less than 2ω—that is ccc-forceably necessary
is ccc-necessary. It is a result of [HAM1] that mpccc with parameters is
consistent (relative to the Le´vy Scheme) only as long as the parameters are
taken from H(2ω), so this is a natural class of parameters for this particular
principle. This means that two conditions are met. First, that any instance
of the principle with any parameter in this class is consistent, and second,
that that any instance of the principle with any parameter not in this class
is inconsistent. In what follows, the first order of business upon introducing
a modified maximality principle will be to determine the natural classes of
parameters for which it is consistent. The class of ccc forcing notions itself
will be simply denoted by the abbreviation ccc, and other classes of forcing
notions will be similarly abbreviated.
Modifications to the Necessary Maximality Principle will be denoted us-
ing the same system. For example ✷mpccc(H(2
ω)) says that mpccc(H(2
ω))
is ccc-necessary (the box operator is implicitly restricted to ccc in this no-
tation). This way of forming new principles can be applied equally to any
other restricted type of forcing.
In this work I will try to answer questions concerning the consistency
strengths of these modified maximality principles. The work is organized
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around the various classes of forcing notions (forcing notions) that occur in
various modifications of the maximality principle. After a chapter on general
concepts, Chapter 2 is devoted to classes of forcing notions that preserve
specified statements in the language of zfc, chapter 3 to the class of ccc
forcing notions, chapter 4 to Cohen forcing, chapter 5 to forcing notions that
collapse cardinals to ω, and chapter 6 to forcing notions parametrized by
large cardinals. A goal of this work has been to establish the consistency
strength of any given maximality principle with the most extensive class of
parameters that results in a consistent principle.
Chapter 1
Fundamental notions
1.1 Modal logic of forcing extensions
1.1.1 Set-theoretic semantics
The modal logic of forcing extensions is a notational convenience for proving
theorems in zfc. (A good introduction to the formalism of modal logic used
here is [FM].) The notation is called modal logic because the symbols used,
✷ and ✸, obey certain modal logic axioms when interpreted in the forcing
context. In addition,regarding models of zfc as possible worlds corresponds
well with Kripke model semantics. For any formula φ, ✷φ says that φ is
true in all forcing extensions: for all P, V P |= φ. ✸φ says that φ is true in
some forcing extensions. As stated in the introduction, this notation can be
relativized to specific classes of forcing notions. This notation adds defined
symbols to the language of zfc. But saying φ is true in a forcing exten-
sion is already an abbreviation of a sentence in the language of zfc that
involves an abstract “forcing language” using P-names based on some partial
order P. So in adding modal symbols, we are just continuing a tradition of
adding another degree of separation from the primitive language {∈}. In
order to benefit from the ability to think intuitively, using and mining fa-
miliar concepts founded in Kripke models, we may regard forcing extensions
as accessible possible worlds. But while harvesting intuitions provided by
the modal symbols’ interpretations as necessity and possibility, one should
remain centered in the realization that these are just statements in the lan-
guage of zfc being interpreted in a single model, replete with names for sets
in all forcing extensions.
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For us, it is primarily the economy of expression of maximality principles
and the arguments they require that leads to the use of these modal symbols.
Recall that their definitions given in the introduction are in fact set-theoretic.
Thus ✷, ✸ and their relativized counterparts are defined symbols added to
the language of zfc; they can be safely eliminated from any formal argument
in which they are used.
An equivalent definition of ✷ and ✸ can be made in terms of complete
Boolean algebras, a commonly used foundation for forcing arguments. For
a complete discussion of this approach see [BELL]. If one is working in
a Boolean-valued model V B of zfc, with Boolean values in the Boolean
algebra B, the Boolean value of a formula φ is denoted [[φ]]B. If Γ is a class
of complete Boolean algebras, we have dual definitions: ✸Γφ if and only if
there exists some B in Γ such that [[φ]]B 6= 0, and ✷Γφ if and only if for all B
in Γ, [[φ]]B = 1. All results herein will follow from this definition, including
results on iterated forcing, by translating forcing notions to the corresponding
regular open algebras. In fact, a Boolean-valued model approach to forcing
has a distinct advantage. It allows one to formalize the concept of “forcing
over V ” by establishing a relationship between V and V B. Since this occurs
within zfc, it applies over any model. This frees one from having to base a
definition of forcing on countable transitive models.
1.1.2 S4 forcing classes
Given this set-theoretic definition of the modal operators, we can ask if the
operators in fact behave according to various axioms of modal logic. In our
interpretation, an axiom of modal logic will be a scheme in zfc holding true
for any formula of zfc when substituted into the scheme. If these schemes
are true in zfc, we can conveniently use them to prove assertions regarding
maximality principles. The relevant axioms for our purposes will be the K,
S4 and S5 axiom schemes. The K axiom schemes are
(1) ✸Γφ↔ ¬✷Γ¬φ
(2) ✷(φ→ ψ)→ (✷φ→ ✷ψ);
the S4 axiom schemes include the K axiom schemes as well as
(3) ✷φ→ φ and
(4) ✷φ→ ✷✷φ;
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and the S5 axiom schemes include
(5) ✸φ→ ✷✸φ
together with (1)–(4).
Remark. By the duality between ✷ and ✸, this last axiom is equivalent to
(5′) ✸✷φ→ ✷φ, which is the maximality principle MP if these operators are
given the suggested set theoretic meaning.
We now interpret these schemes in the context of the forcing relation rel-
ativized to a fixed class Γ of forcing notions. If these schemes are interpreted
as schemes in zfc, then the S4 axiom schemes are intended to hold for all
formulas of the language of zfc, with arbitrary parameters allowed. On the
other hand, the S5 schemes are only consistent in zfc when the parameters
for the formulas are restricted to specific sets, depending on the specific class
of forcing notions used in defining the modal operators. This is due to the
equivalence of the S5 scheme with the modified maximality principle asso-
ciated with the forcing class. This point is important, as the maximality
principles we work with will invariably impose restrictions on the parameters
that can be used in order to avoid inconsistencies.
We first show that modal operators defined from any such class of forcing
notions obeys the K scheme. From their definitions, they clearly obey the
duality of the classical modal operators. Specifically,
Lemma 1.1. If Γ is any class of forcing notions and φ is any formula in the
language of zfc, then ✸Γφ↔ ¬✷Γ¬φ.
Proof. If φ holds in some Γ-forcing extension V [G], then, for its negation to
be Γ-necessary, ¬φ would have to hold in V [G] as well, a contradiction. And,
conversely, if ¬φ is Γ-necessary there can be no extension V [G] in which φ is
true.
Lemma 1.2. Let Γ be any class of forcing notions. If φ and ψ are any
formulas in the language of zfc, then ✷Γ(φ→ ψ) =⇒ (✷Γφ→ ✷Γψ).
Proof. Suppose it is false that ✷Γφ→ ✷Γψ, i.e., ✷Γφ is true but ✷Γψ is false.
Then there is a Γ-forcing extension V [G] where φ is true and ψ is false. Then
V [G] |= ¬(φ −→ ψ). So ✷Γ(φ→ ψ) must be false.
The class Γ is closed under two-step iterations if, whenever P is in
Γ and V P |= “Q is in Γ”1, then P ∗ Q˙ is in Γ. We will say Γ is adequate
1As noted earlier, deciding whether a forcing notion is in a defined class will always be
made de dicto in the forcing extension in which the forcing notion is to be forced with.
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if Γ is Γ-necessarily closed under 2-step iterations and Γ-necessarily contains
trivial forcing, that is, the forcing notion {∅} consisting of only one condition.
Examples of such classes include the class of all forcing notions, ccc (the class
of all forcing notions which satisfy the countable chain condition), proper
(the class of all proper forcing notions) and card (the class of all forcing
notions that preserve all cardinals).
Remark. By the definition of adequacy, if Γ is adequate it must then be Γ-
necessarily so (i.e., this continues to hold in any Γ-forcing extension). Again,
these axioms are schemes of zfc, allowing arbitrary parameters for the for-
mula in any instance.
Lemma 1.3. The forcing classes ccc, proper, and card are all adequate.
Proof. They clearly all contain trivial forcing. The classes ccc and proper
are well known to be necessarily closed under two-step iterations. And, the
two-step iteration of cardinal-preserving forcing notions will itself preserve
cardinals, hence it will be in card.
Recalling our definitions of Γ-necessary and Γ-forceable, define Γ to be a
K or S4 forcing class if the operators ✷Γ and ✸Γ satisfy the K or S4 axioms
of modal logic, respectively, and if this is Γ-necessary (i.e., this continues to
hold in any Γ-forcing extension).
Theorem 1.4. Every adequate class of forcing notions is an S4 forcing class.
Proof. Let Γ be adequate. We first show that the S4 axioms are true, then
that they are Γ-necessarily true.
✷Γφ→ φ: Assume ✷Γφ, that φ is true in every Γ-forcing extension. But
Γ includes trivial forcing, whose extension is the same as the ground model,
where φ is therefore true.
✷Γφ → ✷Γ✷Γφ: Again assuming ✷Γφ, we now use the fact that Γ is
Γ-necessarily closed under two-step iterations. Let P be any forcing notion
in Γ. Since ✷Γφ, V
P |= φ. Now let Q˙ be any P-name of a forcing notion in
V P such that V P |= “Q˙ is in Γ”. Since Γ is closed under two-step iteration,
P ∗ Q˙ is in Γ. And since ✷Γφ, V
P∗Q˙ |= φ. But Q˙ was arbitrary in ΓV
P
, so
Γ may be definable in a way that depends on the model; for example, a forcing notion
that is not ccc in the ground model may become ccc in a forcing extension. Consider
the forcing notion P that collapses ω1 to ω, whose conditions are finite partial injective
functions ω1 −→ ω. It has antichains of size ω1 but V P |= “P is ccc”.
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V P |= ✷Γφ. And since P was any forcing notion in Γ, we have ✷Γ✷Γφ. So Γ
satisfies the S4 axioms.
Further, since Γ is Γ-necessarily closed under 2-step iterations and trivial
forcing, the foregoing argument shows that, in any Γ-extension, Γ satisfies
the S4 axioms there as well. So Γ is an S4 forcing class.
Remark. Theorem 1.4 cannot be strengthened to “if and only if” for arbitrary
models. A counterexample is letting Γ be the class of all forcing, with trivial
forcing {∅} replaced by some other forcing notion with the same effect, such
as {1}. Then Γ is S4 but not adequate. However, we have the following
theorem. We say two forcing notions are forcing-equivalent if they both
produce the same forcing extensions. And we define the operation of taking
all conditions below a given condition in a forcing notion to be restricting
the forcing notion to a condition.
Theorem 1.5. If V = L[A] for some set A, then every S4 class closed under
forcing-equivalence and the operation of restriction to a condition is adequate.
Proof. Let Γ be an S4 class of forcing notions. Let φ be the first-order
statement “V is a Γ-forcing extension of L[A].” (This statement takes the
set A as parameter.) Clearly this is true in any Γ-forcing extension of L[A].
So if V = L[A], then ✷Γφ is true. So by the S4 axiom scheme ✷Γφ −→ φ,
φ is true in L[A]. But if L[A] is a Γ-forcing extension of itself, (that is,
there is P in Γ which is trivial below some condition) then trivial forcing is
forcing-equivalent to a forcing notion in Γ, hence in Γ . And if, in L[A], P is
any forcing notion in Γ, and Q is any forcing notion in Γ according to L[A]P,
then, by the S4 axiom scheme ✷Γφ −→ ✷Γ✷Γφ, φ is true in L[A]
P∗Q˙. That
is, L[A]P∗Q˙ is a Γ-forcing extension of L[A]. So P ∗ Q˙ is forcing equivalent to
a forcing notion in Γ, hence in Γ. This, together with trivial forcing being
in Γ, can also be shown to be Γ-necessary. For this, notice that Γ is Γ-
necessarily S4, and that “V = L[A] for some set A” is Γ-necessary. Then
repeat the above argument in any Γ-extension. This proves that Γ is an
adequate forcing class.
The obstacle for a general proof of the equivalence of S4-ness with ade-
quacy seems to be the need to refer to the ground model in the statement φ.
This can be done in the case where V = L[A] by using A as a parameter in
φ.
If a class Γ of forcing notions is S4 then the principle mpΓ has two equiv-
alent formulations.
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Lemma 1.6. If Γ is an S4 class then the following schemes are equivalent:
(1) For any formula φ, ✸Γ✷Γφ→ ✷Γφ
(2) For any formula φ, ✸Γ✷Γφ→ φ.
Proof. (1) implies (2): By S4, ✷Γφ→ φ. Combining this with✸Γ✷Γφ→ ✷Γφ
gives ✸Γ✷Γφ→ φ.
(2) implies (1): Substitute ✷Γφ for φ in ✸Γ✷Γφ→ φ to obtain
✸Γ✷Γ✷Γφ→ ✷Γφ (1.1)
By the two S4 axioms, ✷Γ✷Γφ ↔ ✷Γφ, so the left side of this implication
changes to give ✸Γ✷Γφ→ ✷Γφ.
Most of the forcing classes we will work with will be S4, so ✸Γ✷Γφ → φ
is the form of mpΓ that will be used most frequently.
Lemma 1.7. Let Γ be S4.
(1) φ(x) is not Γ-forceably necessary if and only if this fact is Γ-
necessary.
(2) If members of Γ are necessarily in Γ, then φ(x) is Γ-forceably
necessary if and only if this fact is Γ-necessary.
Proof. The right-to-left implications of this lemma are obvious from the S4
axiom ✷Γφ −→ φ. So we proceed to proving each of the left-to-right impli-
cations.
(1): If there is no Γ-forcing extension V [G] where φ(x) is Γ-necessary, then
in all forcing extensions it is not Γ-forceably necessary. So it is Γ-necessarily
not Γ-forceably necessary. Formally,
¬✸Γ✷Γφ(x) =⇒ ¬✸Γ✸Γ✷Γφ(x)
=⇒ ✷Γ¬✸Γ✷Γφ(z).
This last modal derivation makes use of the property of S4 modal logic
that replacement of a subformula by an equivalent subformula in a formula
leads to an equivalent formula.
(2): We use the additional hypothesis that members of Γ are necessarily in Γ.
In this case, two forcing notions P and Q of Γ can be iterated in Γ since each
remains in Γ under forcing by the other. Such iteration is simply product
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forcing. If φ(x) is Γ-forceably necessary, then there is a Γ-forcing extension
V P where φ(x) is Γ-necessary. Let Q be in Γ. Then in V Q, P still forces φ(x)
to be Γ-necessary (in V Q×P, since P×Q = Q×P, and φ(x) is Γ-necessary in
V P×Q, a Γ-forcing extension of V P.
1.1.3 Possibilist quantification and rigid identifiers
Various quantified modal logics exist, to handle whether or not the existence
of an object can transcend the confines of the world in which some referring
expression is being interpreted. Quantification is possibilist if the scope of
the quantifier extends beyond the world in which interpretation is occurring.
The alternative, actualist quantification, is that which limits existence of
an object to the world in which any reference to it occurs, so quantifiers have
their scope limited to one world. Related to possibilist quantification is the
concept of a rigid designator, a name or referring expression in the language
of a theory whose meaning doesn’t change from world to world. This also
occurs only when existence of an object is allowed to extend to other possible
worlds. Since we are working in zfc, we will appropriate this terminology to
use when talking about forcing extensions simply as models of set theory, not
as parts of a Kripke model, just as we have appropriated the modal symbols
for necessity and possibility without actually talking about possible worlds
or accessibility. Rigidity can be formalized using the technique of predicate
abstraction. We will not do so here.
Whenever a model of zfc has another model of zfc as an end extension
(no new elements are added to any set), it is possible to refer to elements
in the first model as though they were in the second. One opts for rigid
designation in this discourse, in the sense that the models are different but
they have corresponding objects that are structurally the same. This occurs
in the set theory literature, for example, when one writes of making a su-
percompact cardinal, κ, indestructible by Laver’s forcing preparation. The
name κ is allowed to refer to a cardinal which exists in two different models
of zfc, but because the ground model embeds into the extension, there is no
harm in regarding its elements as belonging to the extension. With forcing
extensions, new sets can be added that are not in the ground model, but
old ones cannot be removed. This property is known as montonicity. In
this situation, using possibilist quantification, the Converse Barcan formula
of quantified modal logic is valid, which is expressed as either of the dual
schemes
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(1) ✷(∀x)φ(x)→ (∀x)✷φ(x) or
(2) (∃x)✸φ(x)→ ✸(∃x)φ(x).
We can easily verify the validity of the first scheme when translated into
pure zfc. It simply says that if it is necessary (true in all forcing extensions)
that, for all x, φ(x) is true, then, for all x, φ(x) is true in all forcing extensions.
And this is clear: the ground model contains no element that isn’t in all
forcing extensions, so the truth of φ(x), for all x in the ground model, must
hold in all forcing extensions.
The concept which is converse to monotonicity is anti-monotonicity. It
occurs in Γ-forcing extensions when sets not in the ground model are never
created. The Barcan formula applies to such forcing classes:
(1) (∀x)✷φ(x)→ ✷(∀x)φ(x) or
(2) ✸(∃x)φ(x)→ (∃x)✸φ(x).
This will generally only occur in a class of forcing notions that only con-
tains trivial forcing. However, bounded quantification over sets will produce
an effect analogous to anti-monotonicity, due to absoluteness of the set mem-
bership relation.
Lemma 1.8 (Restricted Barcan Formula). Let Γ be a class of forcing
notions, and let A be a set. If for all x in A, φ(x) is Γ-necessary, then it
is Γ-necessary that for all x in A, φ(x). Formally, (∀x ∈ A)✷Γφ(x) −→
✷Γ(∀x ∈ A)φ(x).
Proof. Suppose that for all x in A φ(x) is Γ-necessary. We want to show
that ✷Γ(∀x ∈ A)φ(x), which can be rewritten as ✷Γ(∀x)(x ∈ A −→ φ(x)).
So let P be in Γ, with G a V -generic filter over P, and let x be in V [G], with
V [G] |= x ∈ A. Then V |= x ∈ A by absoluteness. Then φ(x) is Γ-necessary
by hypothesis. So V [G] |= φ(x). Thus V [G] |= (x ∈ A −→ φ(x)). Since
P was arbitrary in Γ, and x was arbitrary in V [G], this gives ✷Γ(∀x)(x ∈
A −→ φ(x)).
1.1.4 Modal logic of forcing Kripke models
This section is added as a bridge to the traditional interpretation of the
modal operators, since there is an intuitive interpretation of forcing that
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allows one to think of forcing extensions as separate models of zfc completely
outside the universe of the ground model. Although these are not the formal
semantics we are using, they can be intuitively thought of as a traditional
Kripke model, a nonempty set of objects called possible worlds together
with a binary relation on those objects called an accessibility relation. All
the possible worlds in a Kripke model interpret the same fixed first-order
language, which is augmented with the symbols ✷ and ✸. For any formula
φ, ✷φ asserts that φ is necessary, or true in every accessible world, while
✸φ asserts that φ is possible, or true in some accessible world.
Any Kripke model requires a bare-bones modal logic (called K) that
includes at least all axioms of classical first-order logic (including the rule of
inference modus ponens), together with the axiom scheme, for all formulas φ
and ψ,
✷(φ→ ψ)→ (✷φ→ ✷ψ)
and the necessitation rule of inference
φ
✷φ
(The necessitation rule means that if the formula φ occurs in a proof
tableau or proof sequence, then the formula ✷φ is a valid deduction, since
φ has been proved according to axioms valid in all worlds, hence φ is true
in all accessible worlds. In short, if φ is provable, then ✷φ. It does not say
φ → ✷φ.) Additional axioms and rules of inference depend on the type of
Kripke model involved. If the accessibility relation of a Kripke model obeys
reflexivity and transitivity, it can be shown to obey the S4 axiom schemes
mentioned earlier. If that relation is also symmetric, it obeys the S5 axiom
scheme also given earlier. In fact the accessibility relation we will consider,
that of being a Γ-forcing extension, is not symmetric unless Γ consists only
of trivial forcing.
We now interpret these ideas in the context of the forcing relation. Given
any model M of set theory, there are many models of set theory derivable
from M through the mechanism of forcing. We call the Kripke model that
is the totality of these models, together with the accessibility relation “M ′
is a forcing extension of M” to be a forcing Kripke model. If Γ is a class
of forcing notions we can relativize this idea to a Γ-forcing Kripke model as
well.
Again, in this work, the interpretation of modal logic symbols and termi-
nology will be within zfc, hence within the single universe V that models it,
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not in this forcing Kripke model of possible worlds. But the correspondence
of ideas will be utilized freely. For example, without adding it to zfc as a
new rule of inference, the necessitation rule is used in the form that says that
if φ is provable it is then true in all models of zfc.
1.2 Absolutely definable parameter sets
Consider parameters to formulas in instances of mpΓ. Notice that if a set
parameter has a Γ-absolute definition it needn’t really be a parameter at all,
since it can be eliminated by replacing its occurrence by its definition. So, for
any set X whose elements are definable, the principle mpΓ implies mpΓ(X)
for such X . What is less clear, if X itself is definable but its elements are
not required to be so, is whether mpΓ still implies mpΓ(X). Situations of this
type raise questions such as the following.
Question 1. If Γ ⊆ card, does mpΓ imply mpΓ(ω1)?
Question 2. If Γ adds no reals, does mpΓ imply mpΓ(R)?
Note that these questions are about parameters that are contained in
ω1 or R, not the sets themselves. Thus the principle mpΓ(ω1) asserts that
✸Γ✷Γφ(α) implies ✷Γφ(α) for any formula φ with one free variable, whenever
α is in ω1.
Formally, we will call a definition of a set A a formula ψ(x) such that
for all x, ψ(x) if and only if x = A. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions. A
formula φ(x) is Γ-absolute if for any P in Γ, and for any x in V , V P |= φ(x)
if and only if φ(x). A set defined by such a formula φ(x) in all Γ-forcing
extensions as well as in V is said to be Γ-absolutely definable.
Throughout this chapter Γ will be an S4 forcing class. Let S be a Γ-
absolutely definable set (so the definition of S, when interpreted in any Γ-
forcing extension of V , results in the same set—no new elements are added).
We give some examples to illustrate the idea:
(1) ωL1 is absolutely definable over all forcing notions.
(2) Let Γω1 be the class of forcing notions that preserve ω1. Then the
cardinal ω1 is Γω1-absolutely definable.
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(3) The set of reals, R, is not absolutely definable over the class of
all forcing notions.
Let mpΓ(S) be the form of the principle mpΓ in which statements take
parameters from the set S. The fact proven in this chapter is that mpΓ =⇒
mpΓ(S). The strategy in this proof is, for every formula φ(α) which takes
a parameter α in S, to consider the statement ∀α ∈ S(✸✷φ(α) −→ φ(α)).
Since this formula has no free variables (after replacing S with its definition),
it is subject to the principle mpΓ if it holds. If we can show that this statement
is Γ-forceably necessary, then, by mpΓ, it will be true. But taking this over
all formulas φ we have the scheme mpΓ(S).
We use a lemma whose proof is simply an exercise in modal logic, using
the S4 axioms which characterize the Kripke model of any class of forcing
extensions in which accessibility satisfies reflexivity and transitivity. Since Γ,
the forcing notion class under discussion, satisfies these, we will let the modal
operators ✷ and ✸ be shorthand for ✷Γ and ✸Γ respectively throughout the
rest of this chapter.
Lemma 1.9. Let Γ be an S4 forcing class. If φ(z) is a formula in the
language of zfc with parameter z then the statement “✸✷φ(z) implies φ(z)”
is forceably necessary.
Proof. Case I: φ(z) is forceably necessary (✸✷φ(z)): Then there is a forcing
extension V [G] after which all forcing extensions satisfy φ(z). Therefore they
satisfy that φ(z) is forceably necessary implies φ(z).
(Formally, in S4,
✸✷φ(z) =⇒ ✸✷(✸✷φ(z)→ φ(z)).)
(This derivation is an instance of the S4 tautology
✸✷A −→ ✸✷(B −→ A).)
Case II: φ(z) is not forceably necessary (¬✸✷φ(z)): Then in all forcing ex-
tensions φ(z) cannot be forceably necessary, whence it is forceably necessary
that φ(z) is not forceably necessary. But in any world where the forceable
necessity of φ(z) is false, the forceable necessity of φ(z) implies everything,
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including φ(z). (Formally, in S4,
¬✸✷φ(z) =⇒ ✷¬✷φ(z)
=⇒ ✷✷¬✷φ(z)
=⇒ ✷(¬✸✷φ(z))
=⇒ ✸✷(¬✸✷φ(z))
=⇒ ✸✷(✸✷φ(z)→ φ(z)).)
We will say that a class Γ is closed under iterations of order type γ with
appropriate support if there is an ideal on γ (or other definable choice of
support at limit stages) which when used as support for any such iteration
produces a forcing notion which is still in Γ. Moreover, we require that if
PΓ is a γ-iteration of forcing in Γ and α < γ, then Pγ = Pα ∗ P{α,γ} such
that P{α,γ} is an iteration of forcing notions of Γ with support in the ideal,
as defined in V Pα. An example of such support would be where either direct
or inverse limits are always taken; this is Lemma 21.8 in [JECH].
Lemma 1.10. Let Γ be an S4 forcing class, Γ-necessarily closed under itera-
tions of arbitrary length with appropriate support. Let S be any set. Let φ(x)
be a formula in the language of set theory with one free variable. Let σ be the
formula “∀s ∈ S(✸✷φ(s) implies φ(s))”. Then σ is Γ-forceably necessary.
Proof. Let ordinal γ be the order type of a fixed wellordering of S = 〈sα |
α < γ〉. Let σ(s) stand for the formula “✸✷φ(s) implies φ(s)”, where s is
a parameter of φ. By the previous lemma, σ(s0) is forceably necessary, and,
more to the point, this fact is a theorem of zfc, hence, by necessitation,
absolute to all Γ-forcing extensions. We begin a finite support γ-iteration
of Γ-forcing notions by taking the extension V P1 in which σ(s0) is necessary.
Since σ(sα) is still forceably necessary in V
P1 for any α in γ, we can repeat this
construction for another stage, but this time using 1 for α. This gives a model,
V P2 , in which both σ(s0) and σ(s1) are necessary, whence σ(s0) ∧ σ(s1) is
true and remains true in any extension. Continue in this manner for γ stages:
at stage α, let Qα be that Γ forcing notion which forces the Γ-necessity of
σ(sα). Taking a γ-iteration with appropriate support P = Pγ , we obtain a
Γ-forcing extension V Pγ . Let G be P-generic over V . We claim first that,
for every α in γ, V [G] |= σ(sα). To see this, choose any α in γ. At stage
α, we can factor P = Pα ∗ P˙TAIL, and take Gα as V -generic over Pα. But
at stage α, V [Gα] |= “Qα forces that σ(sα
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V [Gα+1] |= “σ(sα) is Γ-necessary”. But V [G] is a Γ-forcing extension over
V [Gα+1] (since Γ is Γ-necessarily closed), so V [G] |= “σ(sα) is Γ-necessary”.
Formally, V [G] |= (∀α ∈ γ)✷σ(sα). By Lemma 1.8, (∀α ∈ γ)✷σ(sα) →
✷(∀α ∈ γ)σ(sα). Modus ponens then gives the statement ✷(∀α ∈ γ)σ(sα),
that is, σ is Γ-forceably necessary.
Theorem 1.11. Let Γ be an S4 forcing class, Γ-necessarily closed under
iterations of arbitrary order type with appropriate support. Let S be a set
which is Γ-absolutely definable. Then mpΓ if and only if mpΓ(S).
Proof. For any formula φ in the language of zfc, and for any s in S, the
formula
∀s ∈ S(✸✷φ(s) −→ φ(s))
is Γ-forceably necessary by the last lemma. Let ψ be the Γ-absolute definition
of S. Then the above formula is equivalent to the formula
∀s(ψ(s) −→ (✸✷φ(s) −→ φ(s)))
which is free of parameters. So by mpΓ it is true.
Another way to express this result is to say that mpΓ alone allows free
use of parameters in S. And that is the point of this section—that as long as
the parameter set is absolutely definable, the actual parameters need not be
definable themselves. There is a way to generalize still further. If mpΓ(X)
is assumed a priori, the argument above allows the adjoining to X of a new
set of parameters P which is Γ-absolutely definable.
Corollary 1.12. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions obeying the S4 axioms
of modal logic and closed under arbitrary iterations with appropriate support,
and let S be a set Γ-absolutely definable from parameters in X. Then mpΓ(X)
if and only if mpΓ(S ∪X).
Proof. In the presence of mpΓ(X), allow the formula φ to take parameters
from X ∪ S. Suppose φ(α) is forceably necessary. If α is in X , then φ(α)
is true by virtue of mpΓ(X). Otherwise, α is in S, which is a set whose
definition is Γ-absolutely definable from parameters in X . So the sentence
∀α ∈ S∪X(✸✷φ(α) −→ φ(α)) is forceably necessary by the above argument.
But this sentence can be modified to take only parameters from X by using
the definition of S, in which form it will be true by applying mpΓ(X). The
collection of all such sentences then holds, and this collection constitutes the
scheme mpΓ(S ∪X)).
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Finally we consider the union of all Γ-absolutely definable parameter sets
which consists of the least initial segment which includes all Γ-absolutely
definable sets. We can call this the Γ-absolutely definable cut of the
universe, VΓ. This is analogous to the definable cut of the universe, the least
initial segment which includes all definable sets. (In contrast with the latter
class, however, VΓ might not be a model of zfc.)
Corollary 1.13. mpΓ if and only if mpΓ(VΓ).
Proof. Assume mpΓ. Any instance of the scheme mpΓ(VΓ) will be an instance
of the scheme mpΓ(S) for some Γ-absolutely definable parameter set S, which
is true by Theorem 1.11
Again, one can say that mpΓ alone allows free use of parameters in VΓ.
Returning to the questions asked at the beginning of this section, we can
now provide answers. Responding to question 1, let card be the class of
cardinal-preserving notions of forcing.
Corollary 1.14. If the ordinal α is card-absolutely definable, then mpcard
implies mpcard(ωα). In particular one can freely use ω1, ω3, ωω19, and beyond,
as parameter set X in the mpcard scheme.
Proof. By Theorem 1.11.
Responding to question 2:
Corollary 1.15. Let Γ be the class of all forcing notions that add no new
reals. If mpΓ holds, then mpΓ(R) holds.
Proof. Clearly Γ is adequate, hence S4. Also, R is Γ-absolutely definable. So
apply Theorem 1.11.
1.3 Elementary submodels of V
Several theorems in this work require construction of a forcing iteration where
each successor stage forces a particular instance of the maximality principle
whose model is being sought; the principle is then true in the iterated exten-
sion because each instance has been handled at some stage. But in order to
define a forcing notion that forces even one instance of a maximality princi-
ple requires expressing that a sentence is forceably necessary. The relation
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p  φ is defined in V with a separate definition for each φ, constructed by
induction on the complexity of φ. So the general relation p  φ cannot be
expressed as a formula with arguments for p and φ. To express this relation
requires the scheme consisting of each particular case. This changes for a set
model M within V . In this case one can express truth (and forcing) of φ in
M as a predicate interpreted in V .
Since the forcing predicate is only definable over set models of zfc, we
employ the strategy of [HAM1] of using an initial segment of the universe
as an elementary submodel of it. One should be warned that the models of
zfc in which this occurs might possibly be nonstandard (nonwellfounded)
models2. In particular, we generalize Lemma 2.5 of [HAM1]. We first add a
constant symbol δ to the language of zfc, intended to stand for some ordinal.
The following arguments will take place in this expanded language, together
with an expanded model of zfc to interpret this constant.
Let “Vδ ≺ V ” stand for the scheme that asserts, of any formula φ with a
parameter x, that
for every x ∈ Vδ, Vδ |= φ[x] if and only if φ(x).
Lemma 1.16. Let T be any theory containing zfc as a subtheory. Then
Con(T ) if and only if Con(T + Vδ ≺ V )
Proof. The implication to the left is trivial. To obtain the implication to the
right, letM be a model for T . I will show that, with a suitable interpretation
of δ, M is a model for any finite collection of formulae in T + Vδ ≺ V ,
which is therefore consistent. The conclusion then follows by the compactness
theorem.
Let Ψ∗ be any finite collection of instances of the scheme Vδ ≺ V . Let Ψ
be the collection of formulas ψ(x), in the language of T , for which there is
an instance in Ψ∗ of the form “∀x ∈ Vδ Vδ |= ψ[x] if and only if ψ(x)”. We
can write Ψ∗ = {“∀x ∈ Vδ Vδ |= ψ[x] if and only if ψ(x)”|ψ ∈ Ψ}.
Ψ is finite, so by Le´vy reflection there is an initial segment, Mγ , of M
such that for all ψ ∈ Ψ, and for all x ∈ Mγ, if Mγ |= ψ[x] then ψ(x). So,
interpreting δ as γ, M |= Ψ∗ (so Ψ∗ is consistent). As Ψ∗ was an arbitrary
2An alternative approach, not taken here, would be to avoid these nonstandard models
by constructing a model for a maximality principle that applies to any finite fragment
of zfc and then finally applying the compactness theorem to find a model of the full
maximality principle. Our approach will be to apply the compactness theorem earlier on,
and allow iterations to construct models of the full maximality principles.
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finite collection of formulas from Vδ ≺ V , and sinceM also satisfies any finite
fragment of T (being a model of T ), the entire theory T +Vδ ≺ V is therefore
consistent.
The proof of Lemma 1.16 relies on a compactness argument to establish a
modelM ′ for zfc+Vδ ≺ V given the existence of a modelM for zfc alone. In
fact, a sharper observation can be made which relates these models, namely,
it can be arranged that M ≺ M ′. This can be shown by “reproving” the
compactness theorem in building M ′ as an ultraproduct. An alternate proof
is also given which follows a Henkin style proof.
We first introduce a notation for an idea that will recur through the
chapter. Let T be any theory containing zfc as a subtheory. Let I = {Φ ⊆
T |Φ is finite } be the set of finite collections of formulas in the theory T . For
each Φ in I, let Vδ ≺Φ V denote the collection of statements {“∀x ∈ Vδ(Vδ |=
φ[x] if and only if φ(x))”|φ ∈ Φ}, that is, those instances of Vδ ≺ V only
mentioning those formulas φ in Φ. Notice that any finite subcollection of the
scheme Vδ ≺ V can be so represented.
Lemma 1.17. Let T be any theory containing zfc as a subtheory. Suppose
M |= T . Then there is M ′ |= T + Vδ ≺ V such that M ≺ M
′.
First proof. Let M be a model for theory T . By the Le´vy Reflection Theo-
rem, there is a δ = δΦ for which Vδ ≺Φ V . So the expansion of the model M
to 〈M, δΦ〉 is a model of T + Vδ ≺Φ V . Denote this expanded model by MΦ.
(Notice that if Φ ⊆ Ψ, thenMΨ |= Vδ ≺Φ V .) Now construct an ultrafilter on
I as follows: For each Φ ∈ I, define dΦ = {Ψ ∈ I|Φ ⊆ Ψ}, the set of finite col-
lections of formulas containing Φ as a subcollection. Then DI = {dΦ|Φ ∈ I}
is easily seen to be a filter on I. And by Zorn’s Lemma, there is an ultrafilter
UI ⊇ DI . We can now take the ultraproduct 〈M
′, δ〉 =
∏
MΦ/UI . Then
〈M ′, δ〉 is a model of Vδ ≺Φ V , for any Φ in I (just apply  Los’s Theorem to
the set {Ψ ∈ I|MΨ |= Vδ ≺Φ V } ⊇ dΦ ∈ UI).
Since 〈M ′, δ〉 is a model of any finite subcollection of Vδ ≺ V (where δ
is the element of the ultraproduct which represents the equivalence class of
the mapping I to M via Φ 7→ δΦ), it must satisfy the entire scheme Vδ ≺ V .
Finally, the reduct M ′ of 〈M ′, δ〉 is simply the ultrapower of the model M
over the ultrafilter UI , so M
′ |= T and M ≺M ′.
Second proof. LetM be a model for theory T . Let T ′ be the elementary dia-
gram of M together with the scheme Vδ ≺ V . By a Le´vy Reflection argument,
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T ′ is finitely consistent: any finite set of statements of T ′ is consistent. So
by the compactness theorem, there is a model M ′ of T ′. But any such model
is an elementary extension of M , since each element of M interprets its own
constant in the elementary diagram which subsequently has an interpretation
in M ′.
The next lemma says that Vδ ≺ V persists over forcing extensions when
forcing with forcing notions contained in Vδ. We will refer to such forcing
extensions as “small”. (The condition P ∈ Vδ precludes, say, collapsing δ to ω,
which would destroy the scheme Vδ ≺ V .) In the following results, Vδ[G] ≺
V [G] will mean the obvious thing, namely that V [G] |= Vδ ≺ V , where
Vδ is interpreted as Vδ[G] in V [G]. The expression Vδ[G] is unambiguous,
since in our usage, G is always generic over small forcing, in which case
(Vδ)[G] = (V [G])δ.
Lemma 1.18. Let Vδ ≺ V , let P ∈ Vδ be a notion of forcing and let G be
V -generic over P. Then Vδ[G] ≺ V [G].
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Vδ[G] such that Vδ[G] |= φ(x). Then there is a condition
p ∈ G ⊆ P such that Vδ |= p  φ(x˙), so by elementarity V |= p  φ(x˙), hence
V [G] |= φ(x).
This is the way an initial segment Vδ, an elementary submodel of the
universe, is used in a forcing iteration to obtain a model in which a desired
maximality principle holds. Once a forcing notion has been found at each
stage to force the necessity of a particular forceably necessary formula in the
elementary submodel, a generic G can then be taken to produce an actual
extension which is also an elementary submodel in which the next iteration
is definable.
Another direction in which Lemma 1.16 can be generalized is to show
there is an unbounded class of cardinals δ for which Vδ ≺ V . This uses the
following strong form of the reflection theorem.
Lemma 1.19 (Le´vy). For any finite list of formulas Φ in the language of
zfc the following is a theorem of zfc:
There is a club class of cardinals such that for each δ in C, Vδ ≺Φ V .
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose the list Φ = {φ1 . . . φn} is closed
under subformulas. Define a class function f : ORD → ORD as follows:
For α in ORD, let f(α) be the least ordinal γ such that, for all x in Vα,
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and for all i = 1 . . . n there exists y such that φi(x, y) and y is in Vγ. Let
D = {β ∈ ORD|f“β ⊆ β} = the closure points of f . It is easy to see that
D is a club class. For any δ in D, absoluteness for φ1 . . . φn between Vδ and
V can be proven by induction on the complexity of each φi: Absoluteness
will be preserved under boolean connectives, and the same is true under
existential quantification (the Tarski-Vaught criterion is satisfied since δ is a
closure point of the function f). Since the cardinals also form a club class,
the intersection of them with D will be the desired club C.
This leads to the next theorem, another variation of Lemma 1.16. As in
Lemma 1.17, the “ground” model is expanded to interpret a new predicate
symbol in the language, which in this case is a name for a club class.
Theorem 1.20. Let T0 be a theory containing zfc. Then the following are
equivalent:
(1) Con(T0)
(2) Con(T0 + T )
where T is the theory in the language {∈, C} which contains all instances
of the Replacement and Comprehension axiom schemes augmented with the
relation symbol C added to the language, and which asserts
(i) C = 〈δα|α ∈ ORD〉 is an unbounded class of cardinals.
(ii) For any formula φ, the following is true: for all δ in C, Vδ ≺
V .
(iii) for all α in ORD, δα < cof(δα+1).
Proof. (2) implies (1): Trivial.
(1) implies (2): We first give a model where theory T only includes as-
sertions (i) and (ii). Let M be a model of theory T0. It will suffice to
show that every finite subtheory of T0 + T is consistent. So let F be such
a finite subtheory. That is, F ⊆ zfc + {σ1, . . . σn} ∪ {“C is club”}, where
σi = “∀δ ∈ C∀x ∈ Vδ(Vδ |= φi[x] if and only if φi(x))”. We show that M
is a model for F : Fix {φ1, . . . , φn}. By Lemma 1.19, there is a definable
club class of cardinals C such that for all i in 1, . . . , n, M |= “C is a club
class”+“∀δ ∈ C, Vδ |= φi[x] if and only if φi(x)”. But this is σi, so M |= σi.
And since M models T0, it is a model for F . And by compactness, M all of
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T0 and T , where T includes assertions (i) and (ii). But from M we can find
a model which has a club C which satisfies assertion (iii) as well. Simply
define a new class club to be a continuous subsequence of the original one by
inductively defining, for each ordinal α, δα+1 = the δ
+
α
th
element that follows
δα in C. Take suprema (which are, in fact, unions) at limits. Interpreting
the symbol C to be this thinned club ensures that δα < cof(δα+1).
One should stress that in all applications of Theorem 1.20 one is using
the language of zfc expanded to have the relation symbol C, and that the
theory includes theory T as described in the theorem as well as zfc in this
expanded language.
Lemma 1.17 makes it conceptually easier to include in the theory T state-
ments about some element κ of V referring to it by a name added to the
language of zfc. This is done by expanding the model M to interpret the
name of κ. Equiconsistency of such statements together with Vδ ≺ V follows
from Lemma 1.17 since the name for κ is “rigid”—the model for Vδ ≺ V can
be taken to be an elementary extension, so the same κ can be found in both
models. The next lemma, illustrating this, is an enhancement of Lemma 1.16
that provides a condition on δ.
Lemma 1.21. Let T be any theory containing zfc as a subtheory. Let κ
be any ordinal in a model M of T expanded to include κ. Then there is an
elementary extension M ′ of M which is a model of T + Vδ ≺ V + cof(δ) > κ
Proof. We proceed exactly as in Lemma 1.16, performing additional work to
address the requirement on δ:
By Le´vy Reflection Lemma 1.19, for any fixed finite Φ ⊆ T , the class
{α ∈ ORD|Vα ≺Φ V } is closed and unbounded. So it has a κ
+th member.
We interpret δ as this member, giving cof(δ) = κ+ and Vα ≺Φ V . The rest
of the proof of Lemma 1.16 now gives M ′ |= T + Vδ ≺ V+cof(δ) > κ.
A typical application of this lemma is to ensure that the cofinality of δ is
greater than ω.
We include one equiconsistency result to be used in the next chapter that
uses the results of this section.
Lemma 1.22. Let X be any set, and let Γ be an S4 class of forcing notions,
closed under iterations of length κ = |X| with appropriate support. Suppose
Vδ ≺ V and cof(δ) > κ. Then there is a forcing notion P in Γ such that
V P |= mpΓ(X
V ) and P ∈ Vδ.
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Remark. The notation “XV ” for the parameter set is to emphasize the de
re interpretation of the symbol X— that X represents the same set in V P
as when interpreted in V . This is a different situation from Lemma 3.2,
where the parameter set RV is different from R in V P. This is because R is
a definition of a set, and is interpreted de dicto, hence differently in V and
V P.
Proof. Let κ = |X|. Let pi : ω × κ −→ κ be a bijective pairing function.
Enumerate all formulas with one parameter in the language of set theory as
〈φn|n ∈ ω〉 and all elements x ofX as 〈xµ|µ ∈ κ〉. Define a κ-iteration P = Pκ
of Γ forcing notions, with appropriate support, as follows. At successor
stages, let Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α, where, if α = pi(n, µ) and V
Pα
δ |= “φn(xµ)
is Γ-forceably necessary”, then V Pαδ |= “Qα is a forcing notion in Γ that
forces ‘φn(xµ) is Γ-necessary’ ”; otherwise, Qα is {∅}, the trivial forcing. Use
appropriate support at limit stages. Note that, since cof(δ) > κ, Pα is in Vδ
for all α < κ.
Let G be V -generic over P. The claim is that V [G] |= mpΓ(X). To prove
the claim, suppose x ∈ X and V [G] |= “φ(x) is Γ-forceably necessary”. It
will suffice to show that V [G] |= “ φ(x) is Γ-necessary”. Let φ = φn and
x = xµ for some α = pi(n, µ). By factoring, V [G] = V [Gα][GTAIL] |= “φ(x)
is Γ-forceably necessary”, so V [Gα] |= “φ(x) is Γ-forceably necessary” as
well. By elementarity, Vδ[Gα] |= “φ(x) is Γ-forceably necessary”. But at
stage α, the forcing notion Q in Vδ has been defined to force ✷Γφn(xµ). So
Vδ[Gα+1] |= “φ(x) is Γ-necessary”. Again by elementarity, V [Gα+1] |= “φ(x)
is Γ-necessary”. And since V [G] is a Γ-forcing extension of V [Gα+1], V [G] |=
“φ(x) is Γ-necessary”. This proves the claim. Finally, since the iteration of
P has appropriate support, P is in Γ. And since cof(δ) > κ, P is in Vδ.
Remark. A clear similarity can be seen between Lemma 1.22 and Lemma 1.10.
The key difference is that, in Lemma 1.10, we are establishing a proto-
maximality principle for a single formula, for which a definition of the forcing
relation is available. Here, in Lemma 1.22, we need a uniform definition of
the forcing relation for all formulas, hence the need for the set model Vδ.
Chapter 2
MPΨ and variations
In this chapter we explore the properties of maximality principles of the form
mpΨ = mpΓΨ , where ΓΨ is the class of forcing notions preserving the truth
of some particular sentence Ψ. To introduce classes of this type, we first
discuss one sentence, ch, the continuum hypothesis. Let Γch be the class
of all forcing notions P that preserve ch. Thus, if it holds, then P is in
Γch if and only if V
P |= ch. And, if ch does not hold, Γch is the class
of all forcing. Let mpch denote the modified maximality principle restricted
to Γch. We will denote the modal operator Γch-necessary by ✷ch and
denote Γch-forceable by ✸ch. As a warmup to more general results, we
will first show that the principle mpch is actually logically equivalent to mp
itself together with ch. We show the two directions of implication in two
separate theorems, since they each generalize to apply to more general classes
of forcing notions.
Lemma 2.1. Γch is adequate, and therefore an S4 forcing class.
Proof. Clearly trivial forcing preserves ch. And if P preserves ch and V P |=
“Q preserves ch”, then P ∗ Q˙ preserves ch as well. And these facts are
Γch-necessary, since they are provable in zfc.
Remark. Since the modal logic S4 applies to the necessity and possibility
operators ✷ch and ✸ch, the principle mpch, or “✸ch✷chφ implies φ”, is
equivalent to “✸ch✷chφ implies ✷chφ”. So for the rest of this section the
form of the maximality principle we will use in proofs will be
✸ch✷chφ implies φ,
that is, a formula which is Γch-forceably necessary must be true.
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Theorem 2.2. The principle mpch is equivalent to mp+ ch.
Proof. To prove the forward implication, assume mpch (✸ch✷chφ implies
φ, for all statements φ). We first claim that, in fact, ch must be true: ch is
certainly Γch-forceable (✸chch). And in the extension where ch becomes
true, ch is Γch-necessary. So ch is Γch-forceably necessary (✸ch✷chch),
so by mpch, ch is true.
To establish mp, suppose that φ is forceably necessary. It will suffice to
infer that φ is true. There exists a forcing notion P such that V P satisfies
that φ is necessary. Let Q be any forcing notion that forces ch to be true
in V P∗Q˙. Notice that φ is necessary in V P∗Q˙ as well, since V P |= ✷φ. So
V P∗Q˙ satisfies both ✷φ and ch. Since P ∗ Q˙ is in Γch, we have that ✷φ is
Γch-forceable. But ✷φ implies ✷chφ, so ✸ch✷chφ. Finally, by mpch, φ is
true.
To prove the reverse implication, suppose φ is Γch-forceably necessary,
that is, ✷chφ is Γch-forceable. ✷chφ is therefore forceable. Said another
way, there is a forcing extension in which any further forcing satisfies φ, unless
it is a forcing that is not in Γch and does not preserve ch. So φ ∨ ¬ch is
forceably necessary, and by mp, it is true. But ch is true by hypothesis, so
φ is true, showing that mpch holds.
Theorem 2.3. Let X be any set. The principle mpch(X) is equivalent to
mp(X) + ch.
Proof. The same as the previous proof, since whether the formula instances
of mpch used in that proof had parameters or not was irrelevant.
Corollary 2.4. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc+mpch)
(2) Con(zfc+mp)
(3) Con(zfc).
Remark. This answers a question posed by Hamkins in [HAM1].
Proof. (2)⇐⇒ (3) by [HAM1]. Since neither ch nor its negation is forceably
necessary by general forcing, zfc+mp+ch is equiconsistent with zfc+mp.
Then (1)⇐⇒ (2) by Theorem 2.2.
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The preceding result can be generalized by abstracting the essential prop-
erties of the classes of forcing notions just discussed. If Γ1 and Γ2 are each
classes of forcing notions, when can we say that mpΓ1 implies mpΓ2? The
preceding result suggests possible answers. Suppose Γ1 and Γ2 are classes of
forcing notions. Let us say that Γ2 absorbs
1 Γ1 if it is true and Γ1-necessary
that Γ2 is contained in Γ1 and for any P in Γ1 there exists Q such that V
P |=
“Q˙ is in Γ2” and “P ∗ Q˙ is in Γ2”. One example of this just seen is the
following.
Theorem 2.5. Γch absorbs the class of all forcing notions.
Proof. Let Γ = all forcing notions. Clearly “Γch ⊆ Γ” is Γ-necessary. Let P
be in Γ. One can find Q in V P to force ch, so Q is in Γch. And since P ∗ Q˙
forces ch, P ∗ Q˙ is in Γch.
Remark. Another example of a class of forcing notions that behaves as Γch
does in Theorem 2.5 is coll. The forcing notion coll(ω, θ) is the forcing
notion that collapses θ to ω. The forcing class coll consists of coll(ω, θ), for
all θ > ω. Lemma 5.1 will show that coll absorbs the class of all forcing
notions.
Lemma 2.6 (Absorption Lemma). Suppose Γ1 and Γ2 are classes of forc-
ing notions such that Γ2 absorbs Γ1, and φ is any formula, with arbitrary set
parameters for φ. If φ is Γ1-forceably necessary then it is Γ2-forceably neces-
sary as well.
Remark. We allow arbitrary set parameters for φ, since this does not affect
the argument.
Proof. Assume that φ is Γ1-forceably necessary. Then there is P in Γ1 such
that V P |= “φ is Γ1-necessary”. By absorption, there exists Q˙ such that
V P |= “Q˙ is in Γ2” and P ∗ Q˙ is in Γ2. Since V
P |= Γ2 ⊆ Γ1, V
P |= “Q˙ is
in Γ1 and φ is Γ1-necessary”. So V
P∗Q˙ |= “φ is Γ1-necessary”. And since
V P∗Q˙ |= “Γ2 is contained in Γ1”, V
P∗Q˙ |= “✷Γ1φ implies ✷Γ2φ”. So V
P∗Q˙ |=
“φ is Γ2-necessary”. This establishes that φ is Γ2-forceably necessary.
Corollary 2.7. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be S4 classes of forcing notions. If Γ2 absorbs
Γ1 then mpΓ2 implies mpΓ1.
1The name is vaguely inspired by the absorption law of propositional calculus. Another
way to express the relationship between Γ2 and Γ1 is to say that Γ2 is cofinal in Γ1 where
all forcing notions are ordered so that P ≤ P ∗ Q˙ for any Q.
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Proof. Assume mpΓ2 (in the S4 form ✸Γ2✷Γ2φ implies φ). Next suppose
φ is Γ1-forceably necessary, with the goal of proving the truth of φ. By
absorption and Lemma 2.6, φ is Γ2-forceably necessary. This gives the truth
of φ by mpΓ2.
Corollary 2.8. Let Γ1 and Γ2 be S4 classes of forcing notions. Let X be
any set. If Γ2 absorbs Γ1 then mpΓ2(X) implies mpΓ1(X).
Proof. Since Lemma 2.6 allows formulas with arbitrary parameters, just re-
place φ in the proof of Corollary 2.7 with φ(x), where x is in X .
Corollary 2.7 corresponds exactly to how we proved that mpch implies
mp in Theorem 2.2, where Γch absorbed the class of all forcing notions.
To generalize the reverse direction of Theorem 2.2, one generalizes the ch-
preserving property. Let Ψ be a sentence of the language of zfc. A forcing
notion P is Ψ-preserving if Ψ implies that it is true in V P. I will denote
the class of Ψ-preserving forcing notions by ΓΨ. The associated maximality
principle is mpΨ.
Lemma 2.9. Let Ψ be a sentence of the language of zfc. ΓΨ is S4.
Proof. This proof emulates the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Clearly trivial forcing preserves Ψ. And if P preserves Ψ and V P |= “Q
preserves Ψ”, then P∗Q˙ preserves Ψ as well. And these facts are ΓΨ-necessary,
since they are provable in zfc.
Lemma 2.10. Let Ψ be a forceable sentence of the language of zfc. The
principle mpΨ implies Ψ.
Proof. If ¬Ψ then ΓΨ is all forcing. Since Ψ is forceable, ✸ΨΨ. And in the
extension where Ψ becomes true, Ψ is ΓΨ-necessary. So ✸Ψ✷ΨΨ, so by mpΨ,
Ψ is true.
Theorem 2.11. Let Ψ be a forceable sentence of the language of zfc. Let
Γ be an S4 class of forcing notions. If ΓΨ ⊆ Γ is Γ-necessary then mpΓ+Ψ
implies mpΨ.
Proof. Assume mpΓ. By S4 we can write it in the form that says ✸Γ✷Γφ
implies φ. Next suppose φ is ΓΨ-forceably necessary, with the goal of proving
φ from this. Since ΓΨ ⊆ Γ, we have φ is Γ-forceably ΓΨ-necessary. But ✷ΓΨφ
implies ✷Γ(φ ∨ ¬Ψ), since any forcing notion in Γ that is not in ΓΨ must
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produce a model in which Ψ is false. Combining the last two sentences gives
✸Γ✷Γ(φ∨¬Ψ). Now we apply mpΓ to get φ∨¬Ψ. But Ψ is true by hypothesis,
hence φ is true.
The concept that unites both directions of implication is resurrectibil-
ity. A sentence Ψ of the language of zfc is Γ-resurrectible if there is
Γ-necessarily a forcing notion P ∈ Γ such that V P |= Ψ, in other words, if
✷Γ✸ΓΨ is true.
Remark. ch is resurrectible—it can be forced to be true over any model of
zfc.
Theorem 2.12. Let Γ be an S4 class of forcing notions. If Ψ is a Γ-
resurrectible sentence of the language of zfc and ΓΨ ⊆ Γ is Γ-necessary,
then mpΨ +Ψ⇐⇒ mpΓ +Ψ.
Proof. Clearly ΓΨ absorbs Γ, since any forcing notion that resurrects Ψ must
be in ΓΨ. Corollary 2.7 then gives the forward implication. The converse
follows directly from Theorem 2.11.
This theorem can be applied to obtain useful equiconsistency results.
The next lemma provides some basic facts.
Lemma 2.13. Let φ, φ1, and φ2 be sentences in the language of zfc.
(1) If φ1 implies φ2, then Γφ1 ⊆ Γφ2
(2) If φ is provable in zfc, then φ is Γ-necessary, for any class Γ
of forcing notions.
(3) If φ is provably Γ-forceable, then φ is Γ-resurrectible.
Proof. (1) and (2) are obvious (in modal logic terms, (2) is just the necessi-
tation principle), and (3) follows from(2).
Another basic fact is
Lemma 2.14. If Ψ is provably Γ-forceable, then Con(zfc+mpΓ) if and only
if Con(zfc +mpΓ +Ψ)
Proof. Let M |= mpΓ + zfc. Let M [G] be a Γ-forcing extension of M such
that M [G] |= Ψ. But then M [G] |= mpΓ as well: If M [G] |= “φ is Γ-
forceably necessary” then M |= “φ is Γ-forceably necessary”, so M |= “φ is
Γ-necessary” and therefore M [G] |= “φ is Γ-necessary”.
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Recall that Suslin trees, which are provably forceable either by Cohen
forcing or < ω1-closed forcing, negate Suslin’s Hypothesis by their existence.
By the above facts, the sentence ¬SH is resurrectible in the class of all forcing
notions. (In fact, any resurrectible sentence could be used in the following
theorem.)
Theorem 2.15. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc+mp¬SH)
(2) Con(zfc+mp)
(3) Con(zfc).
Proof. (1)⇔ (2): Via Theorem 2.12 and Lemma 2.14.
(2)⇔ (3): Via [HAM1].
Chapter 3
MPCCC and variations
3.1 The consistency strength of MPCCC(R)
In this section we show a surprising result. [HAM1] shows that the maximal-
ity principle with real parameters, mp(R), has consistency strength strictly
greater than zfc, while mp and mpccc are both equiconsistent with zfc. So
it would seem that adding the parameter set R should increase the consis-
tency strength of mpccc as it did for mp, especially since ccc-forcing will
certainly add new reals that are not in the ground model. However, contrary
to expectation, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc+mpccc(R))
Proof. (2) implies (1): trivial.
(1) implies (2): It will suffice to show that, given a model of zfc, one can
produce a model of zfc +mpccc(R). I will give two proofs of this.
To begin the first proof, we prove the consistency of a weak version of
this principle. For any set X , using our notation, mpccc(X) is the modified
maximality principle that says any formula with parameters taken from the
set X which is ccc-forceably necessary is true. Let P be a ccc forcing
notion. Let us confine ourselves to the model V P, and denote by RV the set
of reals of V P which are not introduced by forcing with P, that is, all reals of
the ground model V . Let the principle mpccc(R
V ) be the form of mpccc(X)
interpreted in V P with parameter set RV .
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Lemma 3.2. Suppose Vδ ≺ V , and cof(δ) > 2
ω. Then there is a forcing
notion P in ccc such that V P |= mpccc(R
V ) and P ∈ Vδ.
Proof. This is an instance of Lemma 1.22.
Lemma 3.3. If there is a model of zfc then there is a model of zfc +
mpccc(R).
First proof. Suppose V |= zfc. We will construct a forcing extension which
is a model of zfc + mpccc(R). By Theorem 1.20 we may assume that there
is a class club of cardinals C such that for all δ in C, Vδ ≺ V . Construct
a finite-support ω1-iteration P = Pω1 , such that V
P |= mpccc(R), as follows.
Let P0 be the trivial notion of forcing. At stage α, select δα from the club C
such that the rank of Pα < δα (so that Pα is in Vδα) and cof(δα) > (2
ω)V
Pα
.
Working in V Pα, define Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α, where Q˙ is a Pα-name of a ccc
notion of forcing such that V Pα∗Q˙α |= mpccc(R
V Pα ). Such a Qα is guaranteed
to exist by Lemma 3.2, since the conditions Vδα ≺ V and cof(δα) > 2
ω, are
satisfied by V Pα. This completes the construction of P = Pω1 .
Let G be V -generic over P. I claim that V [G] |= mpccc(R). To see
this, let V [G] |= “φ(r) is ccc-forceably necessary”, where r ∈ R, the reals
as interpreted in V [G]. It will suffice to show that V [G] |= “φ(r) is ccc-
necessary”. Note that r, as a real, is a subset of ω in V [G], while ω itself is in
V . Therefore, since P is an ω1 iteration with finite support and cof(ω1) > |ω|,
r must be in some V [Gα], where α < ω1, P = Pα ∗ P˙
(α)
ω1 is the factorization of
P at stage α, and Gα is the projection of G to Pα. (This follows from [KUN],
Chapter VIII, Lemma 5.14.) But the definition of P required that Qα force
mpccc(R
V [Gα]), which therefore must hold at stage α+1. Indeed, refactoring
P = Pα+1∗P˙
(α+1)
ω1 and setting Gα+1 to be the projection of G to Pα+1, we have
that r ∈ V [Gα] and V [Gα+1] |= mpccc(R
V [Gα]) (as well as V [Gα+1] |= “φ(r)
is ccc-forceably necessary”, since V [G] = V [Gα+1][G
(α+1)
ω1 ] is a ccc-forcing
extension of V [Gα+1]). Therefore V [Gα+1] |= “φ(r) is ccc-necessary”. Since
V [G] is a ccc-forcing extension of V [Gα+1], we have that V [G] |= “φ(r) is
ccc-necessary”, as required.
Second proof. This time, we use a bookkeeping function style argument.
Again, suppose V |= zfc. By Theorem 1.20 we may assume that there
is in V a class club of cardinals C such that for all δ in C, Vδ ≺ V .
Let pi : ORD ≃ ω × ORD × ORD be a definable bijective class function
pi : α 7→ 〈n, β, µ〉 such that β ≤ α. Using pi as a bookkeeping function,
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we define a sequence of iterated forcing notions Pα, simultaneously with a
sequence of cardinals δα by transfinite induction on α in ORD, as follows.
Let P0 be trivial forcing. Given Pα, let δα be the least cardinal in the club
C such that Pα is in Vδα . Define Q˙α in V
Pα
δα
as follows: Let pi(α) = 〈n, β, µ〉.
Consider the statement φ(x) = φn(x), the n
th statement in the language
of zfc according to some enumeration, with single parameter x = xµ, the
µth name for a real in the model V Pβ where β ≤ α.1 If, in V Pαδα , φ(x) is
ccc-forceably necessary, let Q˙α be the Vδα-least Pα-name of a forcing notion
which performs a forcing that φ(x) is ccc-necessary. Otherwise let Q˙α be
the Pα-name for trivial forcing. Now let Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α. Finally, take finite
support at limits. This defines the sequence Pα for all α in ORD. Note that,
for all such α, Pα is ccc and is contained in Vδα .
We wish to truncate this sequence at an appropriate length λ to obtain
an iterated forcing notion Pλ which forces a model of mpccc(R). This will
occur if all reals in V Pλ are introduced at some earlier stage of the iteration
and the cofinality of λ is greater than ω. To ensure this, we define λ to
be a closure point of the function f : ORD −→ ORD which takes β, the
stage at which a real parameter is introduced, to the least stage by which
all formulas φ have been applied to all parameters in V Pβ . We now make
use of the technique of using nice names, discussed in detail in [KUN]. Since
we only need to count nice names, of which there are |Pβ|
ω many in V Pβ ,
this gives f(β) = supµ<|Pβ |ω{pi(α) = 〈n, β, µ〉}. Now let λ be the first closure
point of f : ORD −→ ORD with cofinality ω1. (An ordinal α is a closure
point of f if f“α ⊆ α.)
Let P = Pλ, and let G be V -generic over P. By the usual argument,
we can now establish that V [G] |= mpccc(R): Suppose V [G] |= “φ(r) is
ccc-forceably necessary”. Then there is α = 〈n, µ, β〉, where φ = φn and
r˙ is the µth nice Pβ-name of a real, for some β ≤ α (the name r˙ appears
before stage δ by the reasoning used in Lemma 1.22). Since V [G] is a ccc-
forcing extension of V [Gα], where Gα is V -generic over Pα, V [Gα] |= “φ(r) is
ccc-forceably necessary”, whence by elementarity, Vδα [Gα] |= “φ(r) is ccc-
forceably necessary”. But by the construction of P, if Gα+1 is Pα+1-generic
over Vδα+1 then Vδα+1[Gα+1] |= “φ(r) is ccc-necessary”, so by elementarity
V [Gα+1] |= “φ(r) is ccc-necessary” and therefore V [G] |= “φ(r) is ccc-
1Assuming an enumeration of the names for reals in V Pβ is based on a wellordering
of the ground model, which can be forced by class forcing that adds no new sets. This
induces a wellordering of names, giving a wellordering of any forcing extension.
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necessary”.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Remark. This raises the possibility that mpccc directly implies mpccc(R).
But we will see that this is false.
Remark. The proof just given of Lemma 3.3 makes use of the existence of
closure points of the defined function f : ORD −→ ORD. In order to know
such closure points exist one needs to apply the Replacement scheme. Even
the first proof makes use of the Replacement Axiom Scheme enhanced with
the symbol C, in order to construct the iteration Pα. These arguments take
place in the language of zfc expanded with the symbol C interpreted as a
class club in an expanded model. This is why we included, in Theorem 1.20,
all instances of Replacement and Comprehension that mention the class club
C.
One might expect that Theorem 3.1 can be extended to parameter sets
which are power sets of sets of cardinality greater than ω, such as ω1 or ℵω17 ,
and in fact this is the case. Let κ be a cardinal. Singling out the second proof
strategy above, one can state and prove the generalizations of Lemma 3.3 and
Theorem 3.1 as:
Lemma 3.4. Let κ be any ccc-absolutely definable cardinal. If there is a
model of zfc then there is a model of zfc+mpccc(H(κ))
Proof. As before, the proof consists in finding a ccc-forcing extension model
for mpccc(H(κ)). Let V be a model of zfc. We use the same bookkeeping
class function and again assume in V a class club of cardinals C such that for
all δ in C, Vδ ≺ V . The definition of a sequence of iterated forcing notions Pα,
simultaneously with a sequence of cardinals δα again proceeds by transfinite
induction on α in ORD. At stage α, in defining Q˙α in V
Pα
δα
, α now codes
〈n, β, µ〉 where µ is now an index for the name for a subset x of κ in the
model V Pβ where β ≤ α, and Q˙α forces that φ(x) is ccc-necessary if such a
forcing notion exists. Again let Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α with finite support at limits.
This again gives Pα for all α in ORD, with Pα being ccc and contained in
Vδα.
The length λ of the iteration giving a Pλ which satisfies mpccc(H(κ))
must now have cofinality κ, to ensure that all names of parameters in V Pλ
are introduced at earlier stages. It must also be a closure point of the function
f : ORD −→ ORD which takes β, the stage at which a real parameter is
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introduced, to the least stage by which all formulas φ have been applied to all
parameters in V Pβ . Since we only need to count nice names, of which there are
(|Pβ|
ω)<κ = |Pβ|
<κ many in V Pβ , this gives f(β) = supµ<|Pβ |<κ{α = 〈n, β, µ〉}.
Let P = Pλ, and let G be V -generic over P. By an analogous argument,
V [G] |= mpccc(H(κ)). Since cof(λ) > κ, all parameters in V [G] appear
at some previous stage. The rest of the argument is identical to that for
Lemma 3.3.
Theorem 3.5. Let κ be any ccc-absolutely definable cardinal. Then the
following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc+mpccc(H(κ)))
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 3.4
Remark. This raises the possibility that mpccc directly implies mpccc(H(κ))
for any ccc-absolutely definable cardinal κ. But we will see that this is false.
Finally, we prove what appears to be an optimal result in this direction. It
is optimal in the sense that mpccc(H(2
ω)) is known to be equiconsistent with
an inaccessible cardinal, as proved in Lemma 5.9 in [HAM1], and the following
proof is a straightforward modification of that lemma by only dropping the
weak inaccessibility (i.e. regularity) of δ = 2ω.
Theorem 3.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc+mpccc(H(cof(2
ω)))
Proof. That (2) implies (1) is trivial. For the converse suppose without loss
of generality that Vδ ≺ V , since this is equiconsistent with zfc. Define a
bijective bookkeeping function δ −→ ω×δ×δ such that if α = 〈n, µ, β〉 then
β < α. Enumerate the formulas having one free variable in the language of
zfc as 〈φn|n ∈ ω〉. Define a finite support δ-iteration of ccc forcing P = Pδ
as follows. Let P0 be trivial forcing. Given Pα, let α = 〈n, µ, β〉. If φn(x) is
ccc-forceably necessary in V Pαδ with x the µ
th Pβ-name of a parameter from
H(cof(2ω)) in Vδ, then let Qα be a ccc forcing notion such that V
Pα⋆Q˙α
δ |=
“φn(x) is ccc-necessary”. Otherwise let Qα be trivial forcing.
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Let G ⊆ Pδ be V -generic for Pδ. We claim V [G] |= mpccc(H(cof(δ)).
Also, the ccc iteration Pδ preserves the cofinality of δ.
Now let V [G] |= “φ(x) is ccc-forceably necessary”, where x is inH(cof(δ)).
It suffices to show that V [G] |= “φ(x) is ccc-necessary”. Since x is in
H(cof(δ)), it appears at some stage of the iteration, Pβ, as the µ
th parameter
from H(δ) in V Pβ , and φ = φn for some n. Let α = 〈n, µ, β〉 be less than
δ. Then V [G] is a ccc-extension of V [Gα], where Gα is V -generic over Pα.
So V [Gα] |= “φ(x) is ccc-forceably necessary”. By elementarity, Vδ[Gα] |=
“φ(x) is ccc-forceably necessary”. But by the construction of Pδ, Vδ[Gα+1] |=
“φ(x) is ccc-necessary”, where Gα+1 is V -generic over Pα+1. By elementar-
ity, V [Gα+1] |= “φ(x) is ccc-necessary”. And since V [G] is a ccc-extension
of V [Gα+1], V [G] |= “φ(x) is ccc-necessary”.
Finally, the ccc iterations below stage δ will leave 2ω less than δ (being
within Vδ, as an elementary submodel of V ) but otherwise arbitrarily large
(for any given κ < δ, it is ccc-forceably necessary that 2ω > κ). So V [G] |=
2ω ≥ δ. But forcing of size ≤ δ imposes the restriction V [G] |= 2ω ≤ δ. So
V [G] |= 2ω = δ, and therefore V [G] models mpccc(H(cof(2
ω)).
Remark. Notice that, by modifying the proof to invoke Theorem 1.20, we
can make cof(δ) as large as we like. Let’s call the desired cofinality κ. Just
choose δ from the class club C to have the desired cofinality, by picking the
κth element in C. For example, if cof(δ) is chosen to be ω23, we get a model
of zfc+mpccc(H(ω23)) + cof(2
ω) = ω23, an improvement over Theorem 3.5.
Remark. The construction in the proof of this theorem actually provides
a stronger parameter set than H(cof(2ω)). At each stage α, all parameters
from H(δ) are allowed, as seen from V Pα. Notice that such stages exist for all
α < δ = 2ω, so if η is an ordinal below α, it is seen by V Pβ as being in H(δ),
for β < α. Since all ordinals below δ = 2ω eventually achieve this status, the
set of ordinals below 2ω, i.e., the set 2ω, can be used as a parameter set. So the
actual result of the theorem is Con(zfc)⇐⇒ Con(zfc+mpccc(H(cof(2
ω)∪
2ω)).
Remark. A similar result is given as theorem 3.9 in [SV], but there is a subtle
difference between that theorem and Theorem 3.6. Stavi and Va¨a¨na¨nen
discuss maximality principles with various parameter sets including H(2ω)
and H(cof(2ω)), as well as various classes of forcing notions, including ccc
and Cohen forcing. Their statements of maximality principles for a class Γ
apply to statements in the language of zfc which are provably Γ-persistent.
(A statement φ is Γ-persistent if when φ is true, then it is true in all Γ-forcing
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extensions.) They also seem to have provided the first proofs of maximality
principles by iterating over all instances. The lineage of such proofs, tracing
citations, goes from [SV] through [ASP] to [HAM1].
3.2 ✷MPCCC
One certainly expects the consistency strength of ✷mpccc with parameters
to be significantly higher than mpccc. Again we can informally argue this
case by making analogies with mp and ✷mp(R), the consistency strength of
the latter being at least that of the Axiom of Determinacy, according to a
result of Woodin (see [HAM1]). We recall the point made in the introduction
that an uncountable parameter is not acceptable for the principle mp (since
the assertion of its uncountability will be falsified by the principle since its
cardinality can be collapsed to ω). With ccc forcing this problem does not
occur, so it seems larger parameter sets should be acceptable. But when
we attempt to include uncountable parameters by using the parameter set
H(ω2), the result is unexpected.
Theorem 3.7. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions necessarily containing
ccc. Then ✷mpΓ(H(ω2)) is false.
To prove this theorem, we will utilize some well-known connections among
ccc forcing, Martin’s Axiom (MA), and Suslin trees. Recall that an (ω1-)
Suslin tree is an ω1-tree which has no uncountable chain or antichain.
Lemma 3.8. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions necessarily containing ccc.
Then mpΓ(H(ω2)) implies MAω1 .
Proof. Recall thatMAω1 is the statement that for any forcing notion P which
is ccc, and any family D of sets dense in P, where |D| = ω1, there is a filter
G meeting each D ∈ D. It is a fact [KUN] that to establish MAω1 it suffices
to consider forcing notions of size ≤ ω1. Assume P is a ccc forcing notion
such that |P| < ω1. Assume also that D is a family of dense sets in P
where |D| = ω1. Let φ(p, d) be the assertion that there is a filter G in the
forcing notion p meeting each D in d. φ(P,D) is included in the scope of this
principle, since the two parameters can be regarded as a single parameter
which is in H(ω2). (It is an ordered pair whose components are each of size
ω1.)
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Claim 1. φ(P,D) is Γ-forceably necessary.
Proof. We will find a Γ-forcing extension (in fact, a ccc-forcing extension)
in which φ(P,D) is necessary. We do this by regarding P as a forcing notion
where p extends q iff p ≤ q in P; it satisfies the countable chain condition,
so it is in Γ. So in the resulting model V P, there is a generic filter G ⊆ P
that will meet all dense sets in P, a fortiori meeting each D ∈ D. So φ(P,D)
is Γ-forceable, since it is true in V P. Moreover, working in V P, let χ be the
statement that G is a filter in P which meets D. χ is upwards absolute,
so φ(P,D) will remain true in any forcing extension of V P. This proves the
claim.
So by mpΓ(H(ω2)) and the claim, φ(P,D) is true (in V ), for arbitrary
ccc forcing notion P of size ω1 and for any family of dense sets D where
|D| = ω1, so MAω1 is true.
Lemma 3.9. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions containing ccc. Then it is
Γ-forceable that MAω1 is false.
Proof. To find a Γ-forcing extension of V in which MAω1 is false it suffices
to find one that contains a Suslin tree, since MAω1 implies that there are
none. But forcing to add a single Cohen real will introduce a Suslin tree (see
[JECH], Theorem 28.12, or [TF], chapter III). This forcing notion is ccc,
hence in Γ.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Assume V  ✷mpΓ(H(ω2)), i.e. that mpΓ(H(ω2)) is
true and holds in any Γ-forcing extension. Thus, by Lemma 3.8,MAω1 is also
true in any Γ-forcing extension. But by Lemma 3.9, one can always find a Γ-
forcing extension in which MAω1 is false, a contradiction. So ✷mpΓ(H(ω2))
is false.
Remark. This proof erases the possibility mentioned in the comment after
Theorem 3.5 that mpccc directly implies mpccc(H(κ)) for any ccc-absolutely
definable cardinal κ. This is because mpΓ(H(ω2)) is false in the extension
that adds one Cohen real. So “mpccc implies mpccc(H(κ))” fails for κ = ω1.
Remark. Furthermore, this proof erases the possibility mentioned in the
remark after the proof of Theorem 3.1 that mpccc directly implies mpccc(R).
If mpccc holds, then it is necessary. So if mpccc implied mpccc(R) then it
would imply ✷mpccc(R), which implies ω1 is inaccessible to reals, but mpccc
is just equiconsistent with zfc.
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Corollary 3.10. The following are all false:
(1) ✷mpccc(H(ω2))
(2) ✷mpccc(H(2
ω))
(3) ✷mpcard(H(ω2))
(4) ✷mpω1(H(ω2))
(5) ✷mpproper(H(ω2))
(6) ✷mpsemiproper(H(ω2))
Proof. (1): See Theorem 3.7. (2): Under mpccc, the parameter set H(2
ω)
includes H(ω2), so ✷mpccc(H(2
ω)) implies ✷mpccc(H(ω2)), which is false.
(3)-(6): The forcing classes of these principles all contain ccc, so Theo-
rem 3.7 applies.
A question these results still do not answer is, what is the consistency
strength of ✷mpccc(R)?
3.3 ω1 is inaccessible to reals under ✷MPCCC(R)
Restricting parameters to the reals, we now ask about the consistency strength
of ✷mpccc(R). Hoping that this restriction on parameters will not lead to
inconsistency, we can at least show that its consistency is strictly beyond
that of zfc. A cardinal δ is said to be inaccessible to reals if L[r] |= “δ
is inaccessible” for any r ∈ R, where L[r] is the model of zfc consisting of
all sets constructible from r. In the case of δ = ω1, the following standard
characterization of this property is useful (see Problem 32.4 in [JECH], and
Proposition 11.5 in [KAN].)
Lemma 3.11. ω1 is inaccessible to reals if and only if ω1 6= ω
L[z]
1 for any
real z.
Proof. =⇒: If ω1 = ω
L[z]
1 for some real z then L[z] |= ω1 = ω
+, therefore
L[z] |= “ω1 is accessible” for the real z.
⇐=: Let ω1 6= ω
L[z]
1 for any real z. Since ω1 is regular in V , it must be
regular in any submodel. Looking at the submodel L[z], this means it will
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suffice to show that ω1 is a strong limit, i.e., that L[z] |= 2
κ < ω1 for every
κ < ω1. Since L[z] satisfies GCH , it is therefore sufficient to show that,
in L[z], ω1 is not the successor of any cardinal κ. Working in L[z], suppose
towards contradiction that ω1 = κ
+. Then κ < ω1, so κ is a countable ordinal
in V . So we can code the pair 〈κ, z〉 with a real w. We move to L[w], where
L[z] ⊆ L[w] and, by definition, L[w] |= |κ| = ω. So ω1 = ω
L[w]
1 for the real
w, a contradiction.
The next lemma constructs a ccc-absolute sequence, which is used in a
subsequent theorem.
Lemma 3.12. There is a family of functions {eα : α → ω | ω ≤ α < ω1}
with the property that, for all α < ω1,
(1) eα is 1-1.
(2) For all β such that ω ≤ β < α, |{ξ < β|eα(ξ) 6= eβ(ξ)}| < ω
(any disagreement between eα and eβ is finite).
Remark. Such a sequence of functions is called an almost-coherent se-
quence.
Proof. Fix a ⊆∗- descending sequence {Aα}α<ω1 of subsets of ω (that is, such
that for all α < β < ω1, |AβAα| < ω and |AαAβ| = ω). Using this
sequence we will construct {eα} inductively, by imposing a third condition
at each stage:
(3) range(eα) ∩ Aα = ∅.
Basis step (α = ω): Let eω be any 1-1 function from ω into ω which
avoids Aω.
Induction step: Let δ < ω1. We assume that eα is defined and satisfies
(1)–(3) for all ω ≤ α < δ.
First, suppose δ = α + 1, a successor. Define eα+1(ξ) = eα(ξ) for all
ξ ∈ α, unless eα(ξ) ∈ Aα+1. In the latter case, by (3) and the induction
hypothesis, eα(ξ) /∈ Aα, that is, eα(ξ) ∈ Aα+1Aα, a finite set, so choose all
such eα+1(ξ) to have distinct values in AαAα+1, an infinite set. (1)–(3) will
thus be preserved.
Next, suppose δ is a (countable) limit ordinal: enumerate the set of all
ordinals below δ as an ω sequence. There then will be a monotonically
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increasing subsequence of such ordinals, {αn}n<ω, unbounded in δ and be-
ginning with α0, an arbitrary ordinal below δ. Our strategy will be to define
a sequence of functions {enδ : αn → ω}n<ω whose union will be our desired
function eδ.
Claim: We can define such a sequence to have the following properties,
for all n < ω:
(i) en+1δ ↾ αn = e
n
δ . (This ensures that eδ = ∪i<ωe
i
δ is a function.)
(ii) enδ =
∗ eαn .
(iii) range(enδ ) ∩Aδ = ∅.
(iv) enδ is 1-1.
(v) domain(enδ ) = αn.
(We write f =∗ g, of two functions when they disagree in only finitely
many places.)
From the claim we can establish the induction step of our original argu-
ment, and the lemma will be proved:
(1) Suppose eδ is not 1-1. Then by cofinality of {αn} in δ and (v), there
must be n < ω such that enδ is not 1-1, contradiction.
(2) For all n < ω, eδ ↾ αn =(i) e
n
δ =
∗
(ii) eαn , which is what (2) says in the
case of αn < δ. Moreover, for any ordinal β < δ, there is n < ω such that
β < αn < δ, since {αn} has been defined to be cofinal in δ. By the induction
hypothesis, the disagreement of eβ with eαn is finite, and since this is also
the state of affairs between eαn and eδ, so also must it be between eβ and eδ.
(3) range(eδ) ∩ Aδ = range(∪n<ωe
n
δ ) ∩ Aδ = ∪n<ω(range(e
n
δ ) ∩ Aδ) = ∅.
Proof of claim (by induction over n < ω):
Basis step: define e0δ : α0 → ω by emulating the successor case in the
inductive definition of eδ: For ξ ∈ α0, let e
0
δ(ξ) = eα0(ξ), unless eα0(ξ) ∈ Aδ.
By (3), eα0(ξ) /∈ Aα0 , so eα0(ξ) ∈ AδAα0 , a finite set. So let e
0
δ(ξ) take an
unused value from Aα0Aδ (an infinite set) in this case. Thus (ii)–(v) are
satisfied.
Induction step: For all ξ ∈ αn, define e
n+1
δ (ξ) = e
n
δ (ξ) (this gives (i)).
For ξ ∈ [αn, αn+1), proceed as in the basis step to establish (ii)–(v) : Let
en+1δ (ξ) = eαn+1(ξ), unless eαn+1(ξ) ∈ Aδ, and so forth.
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Note that the essential properties of the almost-coherent sequence con-
structed are ccc-absolute: the cardinal ω1 is preserved, and the definition is
∆0.
We now content ourselves to quote a theorem from [TF], after some in-
troductory definitions. Suppose a : [ω1]
2 → ω is such that if one defines
aβ : ω1 → ω by aβ(α) = a(α, β), then the family {aβ | β < ω1} is almost
coherent. Set T (a) = {aβ ↾ α : α ≤ β < ω1}, the set of all initial segments of
the functions aβ. Then T (a) is an ω1-tree ordered by inclusion: the chains
have length ω since initial segments of injective functions from ω1 to ω can
only be extended for a countable chain. And each node has finite branching,
so the cardinality of each level is countable. Note that the almost coherent
sequence of Lemma 3.12 can be represented by a function e : [ω1]
2 → ω.
Let Cω be the forcing notion consisting of finite partial functions from ω to
ω. (This forcing notion is ccc). The union of a resulting Cω-generic filter is
then a generic function from ω to ω, which we identify with the corresponding
“Cohen” subset of ω, or Cohen real. If c : ω → ω and e : [ω1]
2 → ω, define
ec = ce : [ω1]
2 → ω.
Theorem 3.13 (Todorcevic). If c is a Cω-generic function from ω to ω
and e : [ω1]
2 → ω is almost coherent, then T (ec) is a Suslin tree.
The next theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.14. ✷mpccc(R) implies that ω1 is inaccessible to reals.
Proof. Assume ✷mpccc(R). By Lemma 3.11 it is sufficient to show ω1 6= ω
L[z]
1
for any real z. So suppose, towards contradiction, that ω1 = ω
L[z]
1 for some
z ∈ R. By Lemma 3.12 L[z] has an almost coherent family of functions
{cα : α→ ω|α < ω1}, which is definable in a way that is absolute to forcing
extensions. And since ω
L[z]
1 = ω1, the family, in V , still maps all initial
segments of ω1 to ω. And L[z] has the correct size of the family. Let e =
{eα|α < ω1} be the L[z]-least such family. The point here is that this defines
e in any forcing extension. So, in the ccc-forcing extension that adds the
Cohen real c, the tree T = T (ce), as provided by Theorem 3.13, is definable
from c and z. Moreover, the definition is absolute to any extension.
Now consider the statement (with real parameters) φ(z, c) = “The tree
constructed in L[z] with the real c, T (ce), has an ω1-branch”. This formula
has z and c as parameters since the tree T (ce) is definable from them. In V [c],
φ(z, c) is false, since T (ce) is Suslin by Theorem 3.13. But by ccc-forcing
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(using the tree itself) an ω1-branch appears, so φ(z, c) is ccc-necessary in
this extension. By the principle mpccc(R), φ(z, c) must be true in V [c], a
contradiction.
Chapter 4
MPCOHEN and variations
Let δ be an uncountable ordinal. Recall that Add(ω, δ) is the forcing notion,
consisting of finite partial functions from ω × δ = δ to 2, that adds δ new
reals. We define the class of forcing notions cohen to be {Add(ω, θ) | θ
a cardinal}. In this chapter we establish equiconsistency of forms of the
principle mpcohen with zfc. We will make use of the fact that, if θ < δ
are cardinals, then forcing with Add(ω, θ) followed by forcing with Add(ω, δ)
is the same as forcing with Add(ω, δ) alone. In fact, these forcing notions
are absolute, since their conditions are all finite, so all the names are in
the ground model and this two-step iteration is just product forcing. So
Add(ω, δ)∗Add(ω, α)∼ Add(ω, α)∗Add(ω, δ)∼ Add(ω, δ), where ∼ denotes
forcing-equivalence.
Theorem 4.1. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V then there is a model of
zfc + mpcohen.
Proof. We find such a model by forcing with Add(ω, δ). Let G be V -generic
over Add(ω, δ). Note that G has size δ. We will show that V [G] |= mpcohen.
Suppose V [G] |= “φ is cohen-forceably necessary” for an arbitrarily chosen
sentence φ in the language of zfc. Now notice that φ is cohen-forceably nec-
essary in V as well as V [G]—φ is forced necessary by Add(ω, δ)∗Add(ω, α) ∼
Add(ω, δ + α) for some α. Let α be the least α such that V [G] |= Add(ω, α)
forces that “φ is cohen-necessary”. We have α < δ, whence |δ + α| = δ,
because α is definable and hence in Vδ by elementarity. But Add(ω, δ) ∗
Add(ω, α) ∼ Add(ω, δ) forces “φ is cohen-necessary”. So V [G] |= “φ is
cohen-necessary”.
44
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Theorem 4.2. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + cof(δ) > ω then there
is a model of zfc + mpcohen(R).
Proof. We use the same model as in Theorem 4.1, by forcing with Add(ω, δ).
Let G be V -generic over Add(ω, δ). We will show that V [G] |= mpcohen(R).
Suppose V [G] |= “φ(r) is cohen-forceably necessary and r ∈ R”. Since
cof(δ) > ω, r is added to V [G] at some “stage”, i.e., by Add(ω, θ) for θ < δ
(if not, and unboundedly many θ < δ are needed to decide r, then δ has
cofinality ω, contradiction). So r ∈ Vδ[r] ⊆ V [G ↾ θ] for θ < δ, where
G ↾ θ = G ∩ Add(ω, θ). Since V [G] |= “φ(r) is cohen-forceably necessary
and r ∈ R”, let α be the least α such that V [G] |= Add(ω, α) forces that
“φ(r) is cohen-necessary”. We have α < δ, because it is definable from r,
θ, and G ↾ θ and hence in Vδ by elementarity. According to V , Add(ω, δ) ∗
Add(ω, α) ∼= Add(ω, δ) forces “φ(r) is cohen-necessary”. So V [G] |= “φ(r)
is cohen-necessary”.
Remark. The use of Vδ ≺ V in this proof was not to circumvent the un-
definability of truth, as in earlier proofs, but rather to obtain the forcing
of the cohen-necessity of φ(x) by Add(ω, θ) where θ < δ. This raises the
possibility that these arguments share a common thread involving reflection
which is deeper than what has been presented here.
Theorem 4.3. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + cof(δ) > ω then there
is a model of zfc + ✷mpcohen(R).
Proof. Take the model V [G] from Theorem 4.2, with G V -generic over
Add(ω, δ), where Vδ ≺ V . In V [G], force with Add(ω, β) for some β. Let
H ⊆ Add(ω, β) be V [G]-generic (so new reals are added to V [G]). Con-
sider V [G][H ], and fix some real x in V [G][H ]. Then x is decided by
a countable subset of Add(ω, β); call it P0. So x is in V [G][H0], where
H0 = H ∩ P0 ⊆ P0. Since P0 adds the real x and is countable, P0 ∼=
Add(ω, 1). This gives V [G][H0] = V [G ∗ H0], where G ∗ H0 is V -generic
over Add(ω, δ) ∗Add(ω, 1) ∼= Add(ω, δ). So V [G ∗H0] satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 4.2, so V [G ∗H0] |= mpcohen(R
V [G∗H0])). But x is in RV [G∗H0], so
adding it did not invalidate mpcohen(R). So V [G] |= ✷mpcohen(R).
Corollary 4.4. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc + mpcohen)
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(3) Con(zfc + mpcohen(R))
(4) Con(zfc + ✷mpcohen(R)).
Proof. (4) =⇒ (3) =⇒ (2) =⇒ (1): Obvious.
(1) =⇒ (4): By Lemma 1.21, we know that it is equiconsistent with
zfc that the ground model V satisfies Vδ ≺ V for some cardinal δ, with
cof(δ) > ω. And by Theorem 4.3, we know, given such a model of zfc+
Vδ ≺ V + cof(δ) > ω, that there is a forcing extension model of zfc +
✷mpcohen(R).
These equiconsistency results immediately raise questions as to whether
any of them are, in fact, equivalences.
Question 3. Is mpcohen equivalent to mpcohen(R)?
Question 4. Is mpcohen(R) equivalent to ✷mpcohen(R)?
Theorem 4.5. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V , then there is a cohen-
forcing extension which models zfc + mpcohen(H(cof(δ))).
Proof. The proof is almost identical to Theorem 4.2. Again, we force with
Add(ω, δ). The single difference is that the parameter of the formula φ is
taken from H(cof(δ)). Since it still has size less than cof(δ), the parameter
appears from forcing with Add(ω, θ) for some θ < δ, and the proof proceeds
in the same way.
Remark. Since the final model is V [G] where G is V -generic over Add(ω, δ),
it is clear that 2ω = δ in V [G]. As long as δ is larger than the continuum in
the ground model, the model created is a model of mpcohen(H(cof(2
ω))).
Corollary 4.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc + mpcohen(H(cof(2
ω))))
(3) Con(zfc + mpcohen(H(ω17)) + 2
ω = ω17)
(4) Con(zfc + ✷mpcohen(H(cof(2
ω)))).
(5) Con(zfc + ✷mpcohen(H(ω17)) + 2
ω = ω17).
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Proof. Lemma 1.21 can be used in the proof of Theorem 4.2 to allow the
choice of δ to have cofinality larger than any particular definable cardinal.
And by modifying the proof of Theorem 4.3 in the obvious way, we get the
necessary versions of these corollaries.
Lemma 4.7. If mpcohen(2
ω) then 2ω = 2κ for all infinite κ < 2ω.
Proof. Let V |= mpcohen(2
ω). Suppose ω < κ < 2ω. Let G be V -generic
over P = Add(ω, λ) where λ = (2κ)V . We compute the size of 2κ in the
extension V [G], i.e., how many subsets of κ have been added by forcing with
P. We can bound (2κ)V [G] above by counting the nice P-names for subsets
of κ. P is in ccc, and |P| = λ = (2κ)V , so there are λω antichains in P. So
there are (λω)κ = (2κ)ω·κ = 2κ nice P-names in V . So the number of subsets
of κ does not increase when forcing with P, i.e., (2κ)V [G] = (2κ)V . But
P = Add(ω, λ) has changed 2ω to λ = (2κ)V = (2κ)V [G]. So V [G] |= 2ω = 2κ.
Moreover, further cohen-forcing cannot destroy this statement: Since ω < κ,
2ω ≤ 2κ is absolute. And 2ω < 2κ is impossible in any further cohen-forcing
extension, by a similar nice names argument: Let Q = Add(ω, µ), where
V [G] |= µ > 2ω, and let H be V [G]-generic over Q. Working in V [G], the
number of nice Q-names of subsets of κ is (µω)κ = µκ = µ (since ω < κ < µ).
So V [G][H ] |= 2κ = µ = 2ω. This shows that 2ω = 2κ is cohen-forceably
necessary. Defining φ(κ) to be “2κ = 2ω”, κ is a parameter allowed by
mpcohen(2
ω). Hence, by applying mpcohen(2
ω), 2κ = 2ω is true.
Lemma 4.8. If there is a model of zfc + mpcohen(H(2
ω)), then it has an
inner model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”.
Proof. We first show mpcohen(H(2
ω)) implies that 2ω is weakly inaccessible.
By Lemma 4.7 2ω is regular (for all κ < 2ω, cof(2ω) = cof(2κ) > κ). And 2ω
cannot be a successor cardinal: for any cardinal κ, Add(ω, κ++) forces that
it is cohen-necessary that 2ω > κ+, so that must be true. So 2ω is a regular
limit cardinal. Since it is weakly inaccessible, L models that 2ω is (strongly)
inaccessible.
Next we show that, if δ = 2ω, Lδ ≺ L. Suppose L |= ∃yψ(a, y) for the
formula ∃yψ(a, y) with parameter a. Let α be the least cardinal such that
∃y ∈ Lα such that ψ(a, y). Consider φ(a) = “the least α such that there is a y
in Lα with ψ(a, y)
L is less than 2ω”. This is expressed using the parameter a
in Lδ ⊆ H(δ). Since this is cohen-forceably necessary, it is true. So there is
a y in Lα ⊆ Lδ such that ψ(a, y). So by the Tarski-Vaught criterion, Lδ ≺ L,
and L is the desired inner model.
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Lemma 4.9. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible” then
there is a model of zfc + mpcohen(H(2
ω)).
Proof. Suppose V |= zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”. Let G be V -generic
over P = Add(ω, δ). We claim that V [G] |= mpcohen(H(δ)). Suppose V [G] |=
“φ(x) is cohen-forceably necessary and x is in H(δ)”. It will suffice to show
V [G] |= “φ(x) is cohen-necessary”. Since x has size less than δ, which is
regular, it must be added by Add(ω, θ) for some θ < δ.
Just as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, let α be the least α such that V [G] |=
“Add(ω, α) forces that φ(x) is cohen-necessary”. We have α < δ, because it
is definable from x, θ, and G ↾ θ and hence in Vδ by elementarity. According
to V , Add(ω, δ) ∗ Add(ω, α) ∼= Add(ω, δ)  “φ(x) is cohen-necessary”. So
V [G] |= “φ(x) is cohen-necessary”.
Theorem 4.10. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc + mpcohen(H(2
ω)))
(2) Con(zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is an inaccessible cardinal”)
(3) Con(zfc + “ORD is Mahlo”).
Proof. The equivalence of (1) with (2) is from Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8.
The proof of the equivalence of (2) with (3) is in [HAM1].
So far a strong analogy seems to exists between the results concerning
consistency strengths of maximality principles for the forcing class cohen
and the class ccc. We pursue this correspondence further into the boxed
(necessary) versions of these principles.
Theorem 4.11. ✷mpcohen(H(2
ω)) is false.
Proof. By Lemma 4.7, mpcohen(H(2
ω)) implies that 2ω is weakly inacces-
sible. So ✷mpcohen(H(2
ω)) implies that 2ω is weakly inaccessible in every
cohen-forcing extension. But there are cohen-forcing extensions that add
any desired cardinality of reals, including successor cardinalities, which are
therefore not weakly inaccessible.
Chapter 5
MPCOLL and variations
Let δ be an uncountable ordinal. Recall that Col(ω, θ) is the forcing notion,
consisting of finite partial injective functions from θ to ω, that collapses
the cardinal δ to ω. We will use the notation Col(ω,< δ) to represent the
Le´vy collapse of δ to ω1, for limit cardinal δ. We define the class of forcing
notions coll to be {Col(ω, θ) | θ a cardinal} ∪ {Col(ω,< θ) | θ a limit
cardinal}, and we include, for technical reasons, all forcing notions that are
forcing-equivalent to some Col(ω, θ) or Col(ω,< θ). Two forcing notions
are forcing-equivalent if they produce the same forcing extensions, i.e., they
have isomorphic regular open Boolean Algebras. This does not alter the
meaning of mpcoll or any variation thereof, since saying “M is a coll-forcing
extension” means the same thing in either interpretation of coll. One sees
it is natural to include the Le´vy collapse with forcing notions that collapse
any θ to ω by recognizing that Col(ω, θ) is equivalent to Col(ω,< θ+). That
is, Col(ω, θ) collapses the entire interval (ω, θ], while Col(ω,< θ) collapses
the interval (ω, θ). So there are natural closure properties for this class.
In this chapter we establish equiconsistency of forms of the principle
mpcoll with zfc. We will make use of the fact that, if θ < δ are cardinals,
with δ a limit cardinal, then forcing with Col(ω,< δ) followed by forcing with
Col(ω, θ) is the same as forcing with Col(ω,< δ) alone. This chapter retraces
most of the same kinds of arguments as found in the previous chapter.
Recall the definition of the absorption relation between two classes of
forcing notions: Γ2 absorbs Γ1 if it is true and Γ1-necessary that Γ2 is
contained in Γ1 and for any P in Γ1 there exists Q such that V
P |= “Q˙ is in
Γ2” and “P ∗ Q˙ is in Γ2”. There is a well-known fact that can be cast in this
language.
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Lemma 5.1. The class coll absorbs all forcing. That is, if P is any forcing
notion, then there is Q in coll ( according to V P) such that P ∗ Q˙ is in
coll.
To prove this, one makes use of a lemma that Solovay used in his famous
Lebesgue measurability result. It can be found as Proposition 10.20 in [KAN].
Lemma 5.2 (Solovay). Let P be a separative forcing notion of size ≤ α
which collapses α to ω. Then there is a dense subset of Col(ω, α) that densely
embeds into P.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let P be any forcing notion. Pick cardinal α to be at
least |P|, and let Q = Col(ω, α). Then |P ∗ Q˙| = α, and P ∗ Q˙ collapses
α to ω. So by Lemma 5.2 there is a dense embedding from a dense subset
of Q = Col(ω, α) into P ∗ Q˙. So, as forcing notions, P ∗ Q˙ is equivalent to
Col(ω, α), which is in coll. So P ∗ Q˙ itself is in coll.
Corollary 5.3. mpcoll implies mp.
Proof. By Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 2.7.
Corollary 5.4. mpcoll(R) implies mp(R).
Proof. By Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 2.8.
Theorem 5.5. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V then there is a model of
zfc + mpcoll.
Proof. We find such a model by forcing with Col(ω,< δ). Let G be V -generic
over Col(ω,< δ). Note that G has size δ. We will show that V [G] |= mpcoll.
Suppose V [G] |= “φ is coll-forceably necessary” for an arbitrarily chosen
sentence φ in the language of zfc. So V [G] |= “there is some member of
coll that forces that φ is coll-necessary”. So some finite condition in
Col(ω,< δ) decides that some Col(ω, λ) forces that φ is coll-necessary. So
there is θ < δ such that V [G ↾ θ] |= “φ is coll-forceably necessary”. Now
notice that φ is coll-forceably necessary in V as well as V [G]—φ is forced
necessary by Col(ω,< δ) ∗ Col(ω, α) for some α. Let α be the least α such
that V [G ↾ θ] |= Col(ω, α) forces that “φ is coll-necessary”. We have α < δ
because α is definable from G ↾ θ and hence in Vδ[G ↾ θ] (and hence in
Vδ[G]) by elementarity. But Col(ω,< δ) ∗ Col(ω, α) ∼= Col(ω,< δ) forces “φ
is coll-necessary”. So V [G] |= “φ is coll-necessary”.
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Corollary 5.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc)
(2) Con(zfc + mpcoll)
Theorem 5.7. If there is a model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”
then there is a model of zfc + mpcoll(R).
Proof. Let V satisfy zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”. Now force with
Col(ω,< δ). Let G be V -generic over Col(ω,< δ). We will show that
V [G] |= mpcoll(R). Suppose V [G] |= “φ(r) is coll-forceably necessary and
r ∈ R”. Since δ is inaccessible, Col(ω,< δ) has the δ-cc, so r is added to V [G]
“at some earlier stage”, i.e., by Col(ω, θ) for θ < δ. So r ∈ Vδ[r] ⊆ Vδ[G ↾ θ]
for θ < δ, where G ↾ θ = G ∩ Col(ω, θ). Since |G ↾ θ| < δ, forcing with
G ↾ θ is “small” forcing, and so, by Lemma 1.18, Vδ[G ↾ θ] ≺ V [G ↾ θ].
Working in V [G ↾ θ], since V [G ↾ θ] |= “φ(r) is coll-forceably necessary
and r ∈ R”, let α be the least α such that V [G ↾ θ] |= Col(ω, α) forces
that “φ(r) is coll-necessary”. We have α < δ, because it is definable from
r, θ, and G ↾ θ and hence in Vδ[G ↾ θ] by elementarity. According to V ,
Col(ω,< δ) ∗ Col(ω, α) ∼= Col(ω,< δ) forces “φ(r) is coll-necessary”. So
V [G] |= “φ(r) is coll-necessary”.
Remark. This is another alternate use of Vδ ≺ V , not to circumvent the
undefinability of truth, but to obtain the forcing of the coll-necessity of
φ(x) by Col(ω, θ) where θ < δ.
Theorem 5.8. If there is a model of zfc + mpcoll(R) then it has an inner
model of zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”. Specifically, ω1 is inaccessible
in L and Lω1 ≺ L.
Proof. This proof just mimics the proof in [HAM1] of the analogous result
for mp(R). First, we see that mpcoll(R) implies that ω1 is inaccessible to
reals: For any real x, let φ(x) be “the ω1 of L[x] is countable”, which implies
ω
L[x]
1 < ω1, which implies δ = ω1 is inaccessible in L. But this is clearly coll-
forceably necessary, by Col(ω, ω1), so it is true. Further, we get Lω1 ≺ L,
by the Tarski-Vaught argument. Suppose L |= ∃yψ(a, y) for a in Lω1 . Let α
be the least such that there is a y in Lα such that ψ(a, y). Consider formula
φ which is “the least α such that there is a y in Lα such that ψ(a, y) is
countable”. This is coll-forceably necessary, using Col(ω, α), hence true by
mpcoll(R).
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Corollary 5.9. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc + mpcoll(R))
(2) Con(zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible”)
(3) Con(zfc + “ORD is Mahlo”).
Proof. (2)⇐⇒ (3): Proven in the analogous result for mp(R) in [HAM1].
(2) =⇒ (1): By Theorem 5.7.
(1) =⇒ (2): By Theorem 5.8.
Chapter 6
Large cardinals and
indestructibility
6.1 MPΓ(κ)
Certain classes of forcing notions are defined from a particular cardinal κ.
Examples are κ−cc, κ-closed, < κ-directed closed, and so on. In this chapter
we’ll explore maximality principles based on such classes, striving to obtain
equiconsistency results by applying the same tools used earlier. Such classes
will be collectively denoted by Γ(κ), to show the role of κ in the definition
of the class. The related maximality principles will then be written mpΓ(κ).
Let the formula σ(x) express some cardinal property. Then, if there
is a class Γ of forcing notions under which σ(κ) is Γ-necessary, κ is said
to be indestructible under forcing by Γ, or Γ-indestructible. In modal
notation, this is expressed by ✷Γσ(κ). The creation via forcing of a model
of zfc witnessing this indestructibility is called a preparation. A typical
indestructibility result says that it is forceable that σ(κ) is Γ-necessary (in
modal notation, this is expressed as ✸✷Γσ(κ). Note that ✸ has no subscript,
indicating that the preparation itself need not be in the class Γ.
The literature contains a growing body of indestructibility results, be-
ginning with Laver’s preparation of a model of the indestructibility of a
supercompact cardinal κ under < κ-directed-closed forcing. Such a κ has
come to be called Laver-indestructible. Due to its familiarity, it may be
easiest to consider Γ(κ) as being the class of < κ-directed closed forcing no-
tions (abbreviated < κ − dc) and σ(κ) as saying that κ is supercompact.
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Laver’s well-known result will then be expressed as ✸✷Γ(κ)σ(κ). However,
various other interpretations will also be possible. In fact, we first prove an
equiconsistency result for mpΓ in schematic form that will have, as instances,
corollaries corresponding to the various indestructibility results known so far,
as well as those yet to be discovered. In each of these cases the class Γ of
forcing notions inevitably depends on the parameter κ, so this will be built
into the scheme. So let Γ(κ) denote a class of forcing notions that is de-
fined in terms of the parameter κ, a cardinal. If κ is clear from the context
of a statement, we may write Γ in place of Γ(κ), leaving κ as an implicit
parameter.
To prove this theorem, we first give a special case of Lemma 1.16.
Lemma 6.1. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions, parametrized by κ. Let σ
be any definable unary predicate. If there is a model M of zfc+Γσ(κ) then
there is a model of zfc +Γσ(κ) + Vδ ≺ V .
Proof. Use Lemma 1.16, where theory T is zfc+Γσ(κ).
Remark. Again we are working, not merely in the language or model of zfc,
but in an expansion which has the constant κ. So if it is consistent that κ
is indestructible by forcing with Γ, then it is also consistent that this holds
and Vδ ≺ V as well. One can assume that κ < δ. This follows from the
proof of Lemma 1.21. In fact, if κ ≥ δ, one could find a suitable κ′ < δ by
elementarity.
Remark. We can use the name κ as a constant in the language of both of
the above equiconsistent theories to denote the same object in both. This
is because, due to Lemma 1.17, a model of Vδ ≺ V can be found by taking
an elementary extension of any model of the theory on the left to obtain
a model of the theory on the right. This is analogous with large cardinal
results in which a forcing extension can provide new desired properties (such
as indestructibility) for κ as interpreted by both the ground model and the
extension. In the language of modal logic, κ becomes a rigid identifier in
this context of different models connected by elementarity. This idea was
described earlier, but only in the context of ground models as elementary
substructures of forcing extensions.
Remark. Note that if Γ is S4 then Γσ(κ) directly implies σ(κ), since the
class Γ includes trivial forcing.
The next theorem draws on the argument in the proofs of Lemma 2.6 and
Theorem 5.1 in [HAM1].
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Theorem 6.2. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions, parametrized by κ, which
is Γ-necessarily closed under iterations of length ω using appropriate support,
and which Γ-necessarily contains the trivial forcing. Further, let σ be a unary
predicate. Then
Con(zfc+Γσ(κ)) if and only if Con(zfc+Γσ(κ) +mpΓ).
Remark. Thus, if we make σ(κ) indestructible by forcing in Γ, we have, at
the same time, a model of mpΓ.
Proof. The implication to the left is trivial. In the other direction, suppose
V |= zfc + Γσ(κ). By Lemma 6.1 we can also assume V |= Vδ ≺ V . Let
{φn}n∈ω enumerate all sentences in the language of zfc. Now recursively
define an ω-stage forcing iteration P such that at each stage n ∈ ω, Pn ∈ Vδ.
Specifically, define P0 = {∅}, the notion of trivial forcing. Next suppose
Pn has been defined, and in the model V
Pn
δ define a Pn-name for a forcing
notion, Qn, as follows. If φn is Γ-forceably necessary then choose Q˙n to be
the Pn-name of a notion of forcing in Γ
V
Pn
δ that forces Γφn
1. Otherwise let
Q˙n be the name for trivial forcing. Let Pn+1 = Pn ∗ Q˙n. Finally, let P be the
ω-iteration of {Pn}n∈ω. Use appropriate support, as required by the closure
conditions of the family Γ.
Let G ⊂ P be V -generic. I now claim that V [G] |= mpΓ. To see this,
let φ be a sentence in the language of zfc which is Γ-forceably necessary in
V [G]. I will show that V [G] |= Γφ. First, φ must be φn for some n ∈ ω.
Factor P = Pn ∗ PTAIL. This gives V [G] = V [Gn][GTAIL], taking respective
generic filters. Since V [G] is a Γ-forcing extension of V [Gn], φ is Γ-forceably
necessary in V [Gn]. And since Vδ ≺ V and Pn ∈ Vδ, Vδ[Gn] ≺ V [Gn] by
Lemma 1.18. By elementarity, φ is Γ-forceably necessary in Vδ[Gn]. But the
iterated forcing P was defined so that Pn+1 = Pn ∗ Q˙n, where Qn forces Γφ
in V Pnδ . So take V -generic Gn+1 ⊂ Pn+1. We have Vδ[Gn+1] |= Γφ. So by
elementarity again, V [Gn+1] |= Γφ. But V [G] is a Γ-forcing extension of
V [Gn+1], so V [G] |= Γφ.
Finally, since Pω is in Γ, ✷Γσ(κ) still holds.
One doesn’t need to limit applications of Theorem 6.2 to large cardinals.
1This is exactly the point at which we need to be working in Vδ rather than V . Without
a truth predicate—needed for a definition of the forcing relation—there is no formula
applicable to uniformly express that φn is forceably necessary over V , for all n.
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Theorem 6.3. If there is a model of zfc in which κ is any uncountable
cardinal, and Γ(κ) is a class of forcing notions preserving the cardinality of
κ, defined using κ, which is Γ(κ)-necessarily closed under iteration of length
ω with appropriate support and which contains trivial forcing then there is a
model of zfc +mpΓ(κ).
Proof. Let σ(κ) = “κ is an uncountable cardinal”. So for κ, ✷Γ(κ)σ(κ). Now
apply Theorem 6.2.
Let < κ− dc denote the class of < κ-directed closed notions of forcing.
Corollary 6.4. The following are equivalent:
(1) Con(zfc + “κ is an uncountable cardinal”)
(2) Con(zfc + mp<κ−dc + “κ is an uncountable cardinal”)
(3) Con(zfc + mpκ−closed + “κ is an uncountable cardinal”)
(4) Con(zfc + mpκ−cc + “κ is an uncountable cardinal”).
From existing indestructibility results arise various equiconsistency theo-
rems, by using the following corollary of Theorem 6.2.
Corollary 6.5. Let Γ be a class of forcing notions, parametrized by κ, which
is Γ-necessarily closed under iterations of length ω using appropriate support,
and which contains the trivial forcing. If there is a model of zfc in which κ is
a cardinal and σ(κ) is a property of κ that can provably be made indestructible
under Γ-forcing, then there is a model of zfc+Γσ(κ) +mpΓ.
Proof. In the forward direction, let M0 |= zfc +σ(κ). By the hypothesis,
there is also M1 |= zfc + Γσ(κ) holds. But then, by Theorem 6.2, there
is M |= zfc + Γσ(κ) + mpΓ. In the reverse direction, if we are given
M |= zfc + Γσ(κ) + mpΓ, then M |= zfc + σ(κ)) since Γσ(κ) directly
implies σ(κ).
Corollary 6.6. Con(zfc + “There is a supercompact cardinal κ”) if and
only if Con(zfc + “There is a supercompact cardinal κ, indestructible by
< κ-directed-closed forcing, such that mp<κ−dc holds”).
Proof. By Laver’s indestructibility result in [LAV], Corollary 6.5, and the
fact that the class of < κ-directed closed forcing notions is closed under ω
iterations using countable support.
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A further result on indestructibility, in [GS], gives a preparation that
renders a strong cardinal indestructible under a class of forcing notions, those
that are κ+-weakly closed satisfying the Prikry condition. Herein I will use
a weakening of this result, that strong cardinals can be made indestructible
under ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing. We will call such a κ Gitik-Shelah-
indestructible.
Corollary 6.7. Con(zfc + “There is a strong cardinal κ”)
⇐⇒ Con(zfc + “There is a strong cardinal κ, Gitik-Shelah-indestructible,
such that mp≤κ−strat−cl holds”).
Proof. By the indestructibility result of [GS], Corollary 6.5 and the fact that
the class of ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing notions is closed under ω itera-
tions using countable support.
Remark. The class of ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing notions includes, for
example, all the κ+-closed forcing notions.
Separate from the cases just handled is the following result.
Theorem 6.8. Con(zfc + “There is a strongly compact cardinal κ”)
⇐⇒ Con(zfc + “There is a strongly compact cardinal κ, indestructible by
Add(κ, 1) forcing, such that mpAdd(κ,1) holds”).
Proof. By [HAM2], a strongly compact cardinal can be made Add(κ, 1)-
indestructible. In this case, Γ = {Add(κ, 1)}, which has just one element. So
if anything is forceably necessary by Γ, then forcing once with it will make it
happen. So any forcing extension by Add(κ, 1) is a model of mpAdd(κ,1).
6.2 MPΓ(κ) with Parameters
Corresponding to the results in Section 6.1 on modifications of the princi-
ple mp which pertains to statements without parameters are results anal-
ogous to the equiconsistency result regarding mp(H(ω1))–which takes real
parameters–in [HAM1]. As before, let κ be a large cardinal. Let Γ(κ) be a
class of forcing notions definable from κ under which the largeness of κ can
be made indestructible in some Γ(κ)-forcing extension. In addition, we now
specify a parameter set S(κ) to be used in expressing the maximality princi-
ple mpΓ(κ)(S(κ)). If we express the largeness of κ with the formula σ(κ), the
generalized theories for which equiconsistency is sought are:
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(1) zfc + ✷Γ(κ)σ(κ) + mpΓ(κ)(S(κ))
(2) zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible” + κ < δ + σ(κ)
(3) zfc + “ORD is Mahlo” + σ(κ).
Remark. The principle “ORD is Mahlo” is known as the Le´vy Scheme. It
says that every club class in ORD contains a regular cardinal.
Theory (1) asserts that the largeness of κ is indestructible under Γ(κ)-
forcing, and that any statement with parameter in S(κ) which is Γ(κ)-
forceably necessary is Γ(κ)-necessary. Theories (2) and (3) are identical to
those in [HAM1] with the addition of the largeness of κ. Indeed, the proof
that (2) and (3) are equiconsistent follows that in [HAM1]; the forward im-
plication is direct: let C ⊆ ORD be any definable club; C ∩ δ is unbounded
in δ so δ, which is regular, is in C. The converse is proved by constructing a
model through a compactness argument using Le´vy Reflection, which can be
done by including κ in an expanded ground model and suitably modifying
the argument of Lemma 1.17.
An unsolved problem for the moment is to prove that Con(1) =⇒ Con(2)
for any specific kind of large cardinal. The analogous proof in [HAM1] uses
L[x], for real x, as an model of (2) within a model of (1). But here we need
to preserve the largeness of κ when we move to an inner model which in fact
becomes the core model. Results for strong cardinals have been developed in
this model, so it may work here. On the other hand, as of yet, supercompact
cardinals have no core model, so for them the problem will probably be more
difficult.
At any rate, the best we can do here is prove the direction Con(2) =⇒
Con(1) for specific cases, which at least gives an upper bound on the consis-
tency strength of mpΓ(κ)(S(κ)), namely, that of a cardinal satisfying property
σ together with the Le´vy scheme. Rather than prove a general version of this,
we will prove it for specific cases, addressing their specific issues. The first
result will bound the consistency strength of the principle mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+)),
where κ is a supercompact cardinal and < κ− dc is the class of < κ-directed
closed forcing notions. We will consider the relative consistency of the fol-
lowing theories:
(1) zfc + “there is a supercompact κ, indestructible by < κ-directed
closed forcing” + mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+))
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(2) zfc + “κ is supercompact” + Vδ ≺ V + κ < δ + “δ is inaccessi-
ble”
(3) zfc + “κ is supercompact” + “ORD is Mahlo”.
We will prove the implication Con(2) =⇒ Con(1) by constructing a model
of theory (1) via a δ iteration, beginning with a model of (2) as ground model.
But first we need the following standard lemma to assure us that this iteration
does not collapse δ.
Lemma 6.9. Let δ be inaccessible, κ < δ, and P = Pδ a δ-stage, < κ-support
iterated notion of forcing such that for all α < δ, Pα  “Q˙α is in Vδ” where
Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α. Then P is δ-cc.
Proof. For all α < δ, Pα is in Vδ and therefore is δ-cc. This is true by
induction: for successor stages each Q˙α is in Vδ, and at limit stages, Pα is
in Vδ because δ is inaccessible. It remains to show that Pδ itself is δ-cc.
Suppose, towards contradiction, that A = {pβ|β < δ} is an antichain in Pδ.
The iteration is with < κ-support. Thus, since κ < δ and δ is inaccessible,
|δ<κ| < δ. So by passing to a subset B ⊆ A where |B| = δ, we can assume
that {supp(pβ)|β < δ} forms a ∆-system. Let r be the root of this ∆-system.
Since δ is inaccessible, we can fix ζ < δ with r ⊂ ζ .
For any p and p′ in B, we have p is incompatible with p′ as B is an
antichain. However, it is possible to choose such p and p′ so that p ↾ζ is
compatible with p′ ↾ζ, since for all ζ < δ, Pζ has the δ-cc. We have supp(p)∩
supp(p′) = r ⊂ ζ . But by Lemma 5.11(f) of [KUN], Chapter VIII, this
implies that p is incompatible with p′ if and only if p ↾ζ is incompatible with
p′ ↾ζ, a contradiction.
Theorem 6.10. If there is a model of zfc + “κ is a supercompact cardinal”
+ Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible” + κ < δ, then there is a model of zfc + “κ
is a supercompact cardinal indestructible by < κ-directed closed forcing” +
mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+)).
Proof. Suppose V |= zfc + Vδ ≺ V + “κ is supercompact” + κ < δ + “δ
is inaccessible”. In V , by the well-known result of Laver [LAV], there is a
< κ-directed closed notion of forcing P˜ that produces a model in which the
supercompactness of κ is indestructible by further < κ-directed closed forc-
ing. Since P˜ has size κ < δ, P˜ is δ−cc, so it preserves δ and its inaccessibility,
together with the statement κ < δ.
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Let G be V -generic over P˜. We now work in V [G]. By Lemma 1.18, we
have that Vδ[G] ≺ V [G]. We will construct a < κ-support, δ-iteration P = Pδ
of < κ-directed closed forcing notions as follows. Let Γ be the class of < κ-
directed closed forcing notions. At stage α let α encode the triple 〈β, γ, n〉,
where β < α, γ < δ, and n ∈ ω. Consider φ(z), where φ = φn, z is the γ
th
element of H(δ)V
Pβ
for β < α. If φ(z) is Γ-forceably necessary over Vδ[G],
then, in Vδ[G]
Pα , let Q˙α be the Pα-name of a forcing notion forcing that φ(z)
is necessary, otherwise let Q˙α be trivial forcing. This defines P = Pδ. Notice
that since every Q˙α is in Vδ[G]
Pα, |Q˙α| < δ, so Q˙α is δ− cc. P is an iteration
of these with < κ support, so by Lemma 6.9, it is also δ − cc. So δ is not
collapsed in the extension, and its cofinality is preserved.
Let H be V [G] generic over P. Since P is a δ iteration with < κ sup-
port of < κ-directed closed forcing notions, P is itself < κ-directed closed.
And the preceding Laver Preparation P˜ ensures that κ is still indestructibly
supercompact in V [G][H ]. The final claim is that V [G][H ] |= mpΓ(H(δ)).
To show this, suppose V [G][H ] satisfies that φ(z) is Γ-forceably necessary,
where z is in H(δ). Since |z| < cof(δ) = δ, z will have been introduced as a
Pβ-name at some stage β < δ, say, as the γ
th element of V Pβ , and φ = φn for
some n in ω. So there is a stage α < δ where α = 〈β, γ, n〉. V [G][Hα] also
satisfies that φ(z) is Γ-forceably necessary, where Hα is taken to be Pα generic
over V [G] and V [G][H ] = V [G][Hα][HTAIL] via the factoring P = Pα ∗ P˙TAIL.
And by elementarity, Vδ[G][Hα] satisfies that φ(z) is Γ-forceably necessary.
But by the definition of P, Pα+1 = Pα ∗ Q˙α, where Vδ[G][Hα] |= “Q˙α forces
φ(z) to be Γ-necessary”. This implies that by refactoring P = Pα+1 ∗ P˙TAIL2
and taking Hα+1 to be Pα+1 generic over V [G], Vδ[G][Hα+1] |= “φ(z) is Γ-
necessary”. Elementarity then gives V [G][Hα+1] |= “φ(z) is Γ-necessary”,
from which we finally have V [G][H ] |= “φ(z) is Γ-necessary”. This gives
V [G][H ] |= mpΓ(H(δ)). Notice that P has < κ-directed closed factors that
preserve cardinals < κ but eventually every ordinal between κ and δ appears
as a parameter in H(δ)V
Pβ
at some stage α where β < α < δ. So δ becomes
κ+ in V [G]. This finally gives V [G][H ] |= mpΓ(H(κ
+))
Corollary 6.11. If there is a model of a supercompact cardinal where the
Le´vy Scheme holds, then there is a model of a Laver-indestructible supercom-
pact cardinal where mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+)) holds.
Corollary 6.12. If there is a supercompact cardinal with a Mahlo cardinal
above it, then there is a model of a Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinal
where mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+)) holds.
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Conjecture 1. The consistency strength of the theory zfc + “there is a su-
percompact κ, indestructible by < κ-directed closed forcing” +
mp<κ−dc(H(κ
+)) is the same as that of the theory zfc + “κ is supercom-
pact” + Vδ ≺ V + κ < δ + “δ is inaccessible”.
Looking next at the Gitik-Shelah result of [GS] for strong cardinals, we
see that the previous argument adapts to handle this case. Again, we will
consider the class Γ≤κ−strat−cl of ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing notions, a
strengthening of the Prikry condition Gitik and Shelah impose. An important
difference between this class and the class of < κ-directed closed forcing
notions is that the most general parameter set of mp≤κ−strat−cl(X) is H(κ
++),
the sets of hereditary size less than κ++, by the usual consideration: one can
regard a parameter from this set as encoded by a subset of κ+, any larger
parameter set will have members of size greater than κ+. Suppose , toward
contradiction, that |x| > κ+ for some parameter x in a parameter set X .
Such a parameter x can have its cardinality collapsed by ≤ κ-strategically
closed forcing. So the statement |x| ≤ κ+ is Γ≤κ−strat−cl-forceably necessary.
By applying mp≤κ−strat−cl(X), this falsifies the statement that |x| > κ
+.
Theorem 6.13. If there is a model of zfc + “κ is a strong cardinal” +
Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible” + κ < δ, then there is a model of zfc +
“κ is a strong cardinal indestructible by ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing” +
mp≤κ−strat−cl(H(κ
++)).
Proof. Here we emulate the previous proof, performing the necessary forcing
preparation P˜ in a model of theory (2) (zfc + “κ is a strong cardinal” +
Vδ ≺ V + “δ is inaccessible” + κ < δ). By elementarity, the construction
can be assumed to take place in Vδ. This means P˜ has cardinality below δ,
and is therefore δ-cc and the resulting forcing extension V [G], where G is
M-generic over P˜, preserves theory (2). Of course, indestructibility of the
strongness of κ also holds in the extension.
Let G be V -generic over P˜. We now work in V [G]. By Lemma 1.18,
we have that Vδ[G] ≺ V [G]. We will construct a ≤ κ-support, δ-iteration
P = Pδ of ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing notions as follows. At stage α let
α encode the triple 〈β, γ, n〉, where β < α, γ < δ, and n ∈ ω. Consider
φ(z), where φ = φn, z is the γ
th element of H(δ)V
Pβ
for β < α. If φ(z)
is Γ≤κ−strat−cl-forceably necessary over Vδ[G], then, in Vδ[G]
Pα, let Q˙α be
the Pα-name of a ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing notion forcing that φ(z) is
necessary, otherwise let Q˙α be trivial forcing. This defines P = Pδ. Notice
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that since every Q˙α is in Vδ[G]
Pα, |Q˙α| < δ, so Q˙α is δ− cc. P is an iteration
of these with ≤ κ support, so by Lemma 6.9, using κ+ in place of κ, it is also
δ − cc. So δ is not collapsed in the extension, and its cofinality is preserved.
LetH be V [G] generic over P. An argument similar to that of the previous
theorem shows that V [G][H ] |= mp≤κ−strat−cl(H(κ
++)).
Remark. Notice that P, in this proof, contains ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing
factors that preserve cardinals < κ+ but eventually collapse all cardinals
between κ+ and δ. So δ becomes κ++ in V [G].
Corollary 6.14. If there is a model of a strong cardinal where the Le´vy
Scheme holds, then there is a model of a Gitik-Shelah-indestructible strong
cardinal κ where mp≤κ−strat−cl(H(κ
++)) holds.
Corollary 6.15. If there is a strong cardinal with Mahlo cardinal above it,
then there is a model of a Gitik-Shelah-indestructible strong cardinal κ where
mp≤κ−strat−cl(H(κ
++)) holds.
Conjecture 2. The theory zfc + “κ is a strong cardinal, indestructible
by ≤ κ-strategically closed forcing” + mp≤κ−strat−cl(H(κ
++)) is the same
consistency strength as the theory zfc + “κ is strong” + Vδ ≺ V + κ < δ +
“δ is inaccessible”.
Other results could follow in this vein. Hamkins’ own results on establish-
ing indestructibility of large cardinals by the Lottery preparation in [HAM2]
should be be usable here. By performing all such preparations in Vδ, they
have the δ − cc property. All that is required is closure under appropriate
support δ-iterations of the class of forcing notions for which indestructibil-
ity is asserted. The resulting forcing notion will be δ-cc, preserving δ, and
a generic extension over this forcing notion will satisfy the corresponding
maximality principle.
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